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3.1  Introduction: Plans for World Monetary Reform Should Be 
Politically Practical 
Designing proposals for world monetary reform was in the 1960s a popular 
‘‘parlor game” among economists. We  will perhaps see a revival of this sport 
in the  1990s. 
The impetus behind such proposals is a serious one. Exchange rate volatility 
turned  out  to be  higher  than  was  anticipated  before  the  move  to floating 
exchange rates in 1973, and the swings were particularly large in the 1980s, 
prompting  proposals  for  government  action  to  stabilize  exchange  rates. 
Among the  (allegedly) promised  fruits of  floating exchange rates that have 
failed to materialize is insulation of each country’s economy from disturbances 
originating among its partners. This insulation property was supposed to allow 
countries to set their policies independently. Meanwhile, the need to correct 
the large macroeconomic imbalances that arose in the 1980s, without setting 
off a world recession, has reinforced support for the idea that interdependence 
may be inevitable,  and that countries should set their policies cooperatively 
rather  than  independently.  Proposals  for coordination  draw  support from a 
burgeoning academic literature that, until recently, was almost unanimous in 
claiming that each country’s economic welfare was necessarily higher under 
a regime of coordination than under a noncooperative (Nash) regime in which 
countries set their policies independently. 
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Plans for full-fledged  coordination, in the sense of  cooperative maximiza- 
tion  of  some joint  welfare  function,  are likely  to  be  too  complex to  be 
implemented  as literally  proposed. Hence the  motivation  for simpler  more 
practical schemes,2  for example focusing on a few key “economic indicators.” 
But the ultimate reason for skepticism that coordination proposals will in fact 
be  implemented  is  that  they  require  nations  to  give  up  some  degree of 
sovereignty over policymaking  for the sake of  cooperation. Looking forward 
from 1990, it is unlikely for many years to come that countries will be ready 
for such a commitment. In the first place, enforcement is a problem even when 
everyone benefits relative to the Nash equilibrium (because each country could 
do still better  by  deviating  unilaterally  from the agreement). In the  second 
place,  given  uncertainties  about  policies  and  about  future  disturbances, a 
coordination regime that guarantees  higher welfare for each country ex ante 
will  nevertheless probably  entail ex post  losses for some countries  in some 
years,  creating  a  great  temptation  for  them  to  break  the  agreement.  An 
American government, for example, would be unlikely to maintain policies 
sacrificing U.S.  economic welfare for the sake of an international agreement, 
for fear of  losing political support. 
If acooperative  regime is to be successful, it must be built on an accumulation 
of  trust. If  countries  are in every year to resist the short-run advantages of 
deviating from the agreement for the sake of the longer-run gains of maintaining 
the cooperative regime, it is necessary that there be either explicit sanctions 
for violations or implicit effects on their long-term reputations. The reputations 
route requires  a passage  of  time during which countries can establish  track 
records by which they can be judged. The sanctions  route requires a commitment 
to give up national sovereignty, for which, again, countries  will not be politically 
ready for some time. This is onc major problem with a proposed return to fixed 
exchange rates, a gold standard, and other ambitious plans for world monetary 
reform. They presuppose a world of surrendered sovereignty, and there is no 
evident pathway leading there from our current world. “You  can’t get there 
from here .’ ’ 
The most we can anticipate is that coordination would begin on a small scale 
in the 1990s, with countries giving up just a small amount of sovereignty in 
return  for  small  expected gains.  Such coordination  could  be  pronounced 
successful  if  announced  international  economic agreements were  not  com- 
pletely  devoid of  substance, if the  agreements  actually  caused countries to 
modify their policies-even  if only a little-from  what they otherwise would 
have been, and if the results can be seen to have raised economic welfare- 
again, even if  only a little. 
If  coordination  on a  small  scale is  successful  in  the  1990s, then  it  will 
establish the prerequisites of trust and confidence needed for coordination on 
a moderate scale in the 21st century: national track records of compliance with 
the international agreements, or perhaps sufficient consensus as to the benefits 
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is that, at each stage, a record of successful coordination will allow an increase 
in the degree of political commitment to coordination in the next stage. What 
is  needed,  then, is  a proposal  for a  sequence of  coordination  regimes, an 
overall plan in which the degree of coordination can begin at a small “epsilon” 
and be gradually raised from there (in theory, someday reaching the level of 
full coordination of policies). 
This  paper  contains,  in  addition  to a  review  of  the  obstacles  to  future 
progress  toward  coordination,  a  preliminary  examination  of  two  modest 
proposals  for the  form that  successful  coordination  might  take.  One is  an 
international version of targeting nominal GNP (or aggregate demand). The 
proposal will be called INT, for international nominal targetir~g.~  The other is 
a supranational bank, sometimes called a Hosomi Fund, which could intervene 
in the foreign-exchange markets, without national central banks surrendering 
their own rights to operate in the markets. In each case-INT  and a Hosomi 
Fund-a  key element of the proposal is that it could begin on a very  small 
scale, build up trust and confidence in the institution slowly, and thus progress 
to higher degrees of coordination. 
The essence of the argument for the need for coordination is that there are 
international externalities  or spillover effects.  If  these externalities  did not 
exist, that is, if each country was unaffected by changes in other countries, then 
the decentralized noncooperative solution would be optimal; there would be 
little role for international meetings or a supranational institution to coordinate 
policies (just as there would be little role for government intervention in the 
domestic economy if domestic markets functioned competitively and without 
externalities). 
One cannot know whether or what kind of coordination is desirable without 
first  knowing  the  nature  of  the  externalities.  Is  the  Nash  noncooperative 
equilibrium too contractionary, because of a proclivity toward  “beggar-thy- 
neighbor”  policies? Then joint expansion is called for. This, of course, was 
the logic of the “locomotive theory”  that gave rise to the 1978 Bonn Summit. 
Or, on the other hand, is the existing equilibrium overly inflationary? In that 
case, joint  discipline  would  be called  for. This  is the  apparent  motivation 
underlying the European Monetary System (EMS). Perhaps the problem is that 
each country seeks by its policy mix to raise real interest rates, attract capital 
inflows,  and  appreciate  its  currency,  thereby  reducing  the  consumer price 
index for any given level of output and employment. This description seemed 
to  characterize  some  major  countries  in  the  early  1980s. Or perhaps  the 
problem,  rather than  “competitive appreciation,”  is “competitive  deprecia- 
tion,”  as was feared at Bretton Woods in 1944 on the basis of the experience 
of  the  1930s. Each  kind  of  externality  would  imply  a  different  kind  of 
appropriate coordination to address it. 
In  section  3.2 we  address  problems  concerning  the  overall  degree  of 
expansion of  macroeconomic policies,  whether monetary and fiscal policies 
are too tight or too loose, rather than the proper mix of the two. In section 3.3, 112  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
more briefly, we address the problem of exchange rate ~ariability.~  It is left as 
a  topic  for  future  work  to consider problems of  the  degree of  expansion 
simultaneously with problems of the monetary/fiscal policy mix, real interest 
rates, and the exchange rate. 
3.2  Overcoming Obstacles to Coordinated Expansion or Contraction 
3.2.1  Domestic Policymaking 
Macroeconomic policymaking is always a tradeoff between the advantages 
of  discretion  on the  one hand  and rules  on the  other.  In  the past, writers 
concerned  with either one of the two problems  often simplistically  assumed 
away the other. If  the aim is to maximize  economic welfare  (a function of 
output and inflation) only for a given period, ignoring long-run implications 
for expected inflation, discretion can be shown to be unambiguously superior 
to rules; after all, how can one possibly gain by agreeing to limit beforehand 
one’s abilities to respond to developments in the economy? If one ignores the 
possibility of short-run disturbances, on the other hand, rules can be shown to 
be unambiguously  superior  to discretion  in a long-run  equilibrium;  macro- 
economic policy cannot affect output  in the long run anyway, and precom- 
mitting to a nominal anchor can reduce expected inflation and thereby reduce 
actual inflation. 
There are  a  few excellent  surveys of  the  literature  concerning time  in- 
consistency,  precommitment  and  reputations,  and  its  implications  for the 
older debate over rules versus discretion. See, for example, Barro  (1986), 
Fischer (1988a), and Rogoff  (1987). It should be clear by now that neither 
extreme in the debate represents the complete correct answer. On the one hand, 
if  the political  system’s policymaking  process  is  allowed  to optimize on  a 
purely short-run basis, the outcome will be overexpansion. Thus some degree 
of longer-term commitment to resist inflationary temptations is indicated, even 
if it is a decision to insulate the central bank from the political process rather 
than formal commitment to a nominal anchor or rule.s On the other hand, in 
a  world  where  new  disturbances  come  along,  it  is  important  that  the 
government  retain at least some ability to respond to stabilize the economy. 
The solution is sume degree of commitment, but less than 100 percent, to some 
nominal anchor.6 
In the context of domestic policymaking, this paper makes no judgment on 
the  desirable  degree of  precommitment  to a  nominal  target. (Analogously, 
when we turn to international coordination, we take as given by the political 
process the degree of commitment to coordination.) 
But  it  can  be  argued  that,  whatever  the degree of  precommitment to  a 
nominal  target, nominal  GNP (or nominal demand) makes a more  suitable 
target than the four other nominal variables that have been proposed: the money 
supply, the price level, the price of gold, or the exchange rate. The argument 113  Obstacles to Coordination 
has been well made by others.’  In the event of  disturbances in the banking 
system, disturbances in the public’s demand for money, or other disturbances 
affecting  the  demand for goods, a policy  of  holding  nominal  GNP steady 
insulates the economy; neither real income nor the price level need be affected. 
In the event of  disturbances to supply, such as the oil price increases of the 
1970s, the change is divided equiproportionately between an increase in the 
price level and a fall in output. For some countries, this is roughly the split that 
a discretionary policy would choose anyway.8  In general, unless the objective 
function  puts  precisely  equal weights  on inflation  and  real  growth,  fixing 
nominal  GNP will  not  give precisely  the right  answer. But if the choice is 
among  the  available  nominal  anchors,  nominal  GNP  gives  an  outcome 
characterized by greater stability of output and the price level. An Appendix 
to this paper shows that a nominal  GNP target  strictly dominates a money- 
supply target, in the sense of minimizing a quadratic loss function, regardless 
how important inflation-fighting credibility  is. 
To take an example from recent history,  the Federal  Reserve, citing large 
velocity  shifts,  decided beginning in late  1982 to allow MI to break firmly 
outside their preannounced  target zone. M1 grew 10.3  percent per year from 
1982:2 to 1986:2. Some observers have suggested that the Federal Reserve was 
following a  general policy  of  targeting  nominal GNP.  For  four years  the 
monetarists decried the betrayal of  the money growth rule and warned that a 
major return of inflation was imminent. Nobody can doubt in retrospect that 
the Federal Reserve chose the right course. Even with the recovery that began 
in 1983 and continued through the four years and beyond, nominal GNP grew 
more  slowly  than  the  money  supply:  8.0 percent  per year.  Thus velocity 
declined  at 2.3 percent  per year,  in contrast  to its past historical  pattern  of 
increasing at roughly 3 percent a year. If the Federal Reserve had followed the 
explicit monetarist prescription  of rigidly precommitting to a money growth 
rate lower than that of the preceding  period, such as 3 percent, and velocity 
had followed the same path, then nominal GNP would have grown at only 0.7 
percent  a year.  This number is an upper  bound  because,  with  even lower 
inflation  than  occurred,  velocity  would  probably  have  fallen  even  more 
than it did. The implication seems clear that the 1981  -82  recession would have 
lasted another five years! 
3.2.2  Obstacles to International  Policy Coordination 
After the initial enthusiasm for the gains from coordination, especially at the 
theoretical level, a number of economists have in recent years been pointing 
out some of its difficulties (beginning, at the public level, with Feldstein  1983, 
1988). 
The obstacles to  implementing  a  successful  regime of  macroeconomic 
policy  coordination  are of  three  sorts: uncertainty,  enforcement, and time- 
consistent inflation-fighting credibility. Difficulties of enforcement and cred- 
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coordination package guarantees that each country will be better off than  it 
would  be in the noncooperative equilibrium,  the country will be  able to do 
better still if it “cheats”  on the agreement. That is, it will be able to do better 
in  the  short-run, assuming  that  the  other  countries  leave  their  policies  as 
agreed; in future periods, the other countries will presumably retaliate by also 
abandoning the agreement. But economists have probably overemphasized the 
difficulties of  enforcement  (see  Kenen  1987,  31-36,  on this  point’)  and 
underemphasized  the  difficulties  of  uncertainty.  If  policymakers  could  be 
certain  as  to  how  various  policy  changes  would  affect  their  economic 
objectives,  it might not be very difficult to enforce cooperative agreements. 
But  uncertainty  is in  fact endemic  to international  macroeconomic  policy- 
making. 
As  we  will  see, uncertainty  is of  three kinds:  uncertainty  regarding  the 
current and future position of the economy, uncertainty regarding the desirable 
optima for the target variables,  and uncertainty  regarding the effects on the 
target variables of changes in those policy instruments which the policymakers 
directly  control.  Each  of  these  areas  of  uncertainty  makes  it  difficult  for 
policymakers in one country to know what policy changes to ask of its trading 
partners,  and to know what policy changes it should be willing  to make in 
return. Even assuming that there are no problems of enforcement,  a cooper- 
ative package of  policy changes that each country thinks  will benefit  itself 
could, ex post, easily turn out to make things worse rather than better. This 
could be the outcome if the baseline level of output, for example, turns out to 
be different than expected, or if the optimum level (e.g., potential output) turns 
out to be different than expected, or if a foreign expansion of monetary policy, 
for example, turns  out  to have  a different  effect  on  domestic  output  than 
expected. 
Uncertainty  greatly complicates the enforcement  problem as well. In the 
first place, policymakers do not have direct control over the variables that we 
refer to as their “policies.”  Central banks cannot determine the money supply 
precisely because of disturbances within the banking system or in  the wider 
economy’s  demand  for  money.  Nor  can  a  specific  policymaker  who  is 
engaged in international negotiations determine  his country’s fiscal policies 
precisely. For this reason, it can be difficult to hold policymakers accountable 
for deviations of the policy variables from the cooperative bargain  that they 
agree to. 
In the second place, ex ante uncertainty means that there will be some states 
of the world in which the temptation  to cheat is especially great because a 
country turns out ex post to lose a lot from abiding by the agreement (relative 
to unilaterally  violating  the  agreement, and  perhaps  also  relative  to  never 
having  made  the  agreement  to  begin  with).  In  such  circumstances,  the 
short-run  gains from abrogating  may  outweigh  the  longer-term  gains  from 
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A third kind of obstacle has been pointed out by  Rogoff (1985a). A coop- 
erative agreement that succeeds in raising economic welfare in one period will, 
if  it takes the form of joint reflation, raise expectations of future inflation and 
may thus reduce economic welfare in the longer run. In such a circumstance, 
renouncing cooperation  may be a way that countries can precommit to less 
inflationary policies. 
This  part  of  the  paper  examines  these  different  obstacles  to  successful 
international coordination and then argues that INT, an international version of 
targeting nominal GNP (or nominal aggregate demand), is more likely than 
other types of  coordination to surmount these obstacles. 
Problems of  Uncertainty 
There are three things that a country ideally needs to know before it even 
can enter negotiations  with  other countries  on coordinated  policy  changes. 
(1) What is the initial position of the domestic economy, relative to the optimum 
values of  the target variable? (2)  What are the correct weights to put on the 
various  possible  target  variables?  (This  includes  the  question  of  which 
variables  should  be  excluded  altogether  from  consideration  and  which 
included.)  (3) What  effect does each  unit  change  in the domestic  (and the 
foreign) macroeconomic policy variables have on the target variables; that is, 
what is the correct model of  the world economy? 
These three elements follow simply from the algebraic expression for the 
economic  objective  function.  We  specify  here  a  function  of  three  target 
variables, although we could as easily have more or fewer. 
(1')  w* = (V2)  (y** + w;*x** + w*P*p**), 
where W is the quadratic loss to be minimized, y  is output (expressed in log 
form and relative to its optimum), x  is the current account  (expressed as a 
percentage of GNP and again relative to its optimum), p  is the inflation rate, 
w, is the relative weight placed on the current account objective,  wp is the 
relative weight placed on the inflation objective, and an asterisk (*) denotes 
the analogous variables for the foreign country. We  will refer to two policy 
instruments: the money supply m (in log form), and government expenditure 
g (as a percentage of GNP). 
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where the policy multiplier effect of money on output is given by y,,  the effect 
of  money on the current  account by x,,  etc. If  we wished  to solve for the 
optimum,  we  would  set  these  derivatives equal  to  zero  (with  the  target 
variables (y),  (x), etc., first expressed as linear functions of the policy variables 
rn, g, etc. In the Nash noncooperative equilibrium (in which each country takes 
the other's policies as given), we would need only equations (2), (3),  (4') and 
(5') for the solution. Each country ignores the effect that its policies have on 
the other country, so equations (4), (5),  (2'), and (3') do not enter. Indeed, this 
is  precisely  the  standard  reason  why  the  noncooperative  equilibrium  is 
suboptimal. These cross-country effects enter only in the determination of the 
cooperative solution. 
Before they decide on a policy change, policymakers must at least know the 
sign of the corresponding derivative. Equation (2), or any other of the eight 
derivatives above, neatly  illustrates  the  three  kinds of  uncertainty.  First  is 
uncertainty  about  the  initial  position,  the  variables,  y, x,  and p. Position 
uncertainty  in turn  breaks  down into three  parts:  (a) uncertainty about  the 
current value of the target variable in question;"  (b) uncertainty over how the 
target variables  are likely to move during the forthcoming year or more in 
the absence of policy changes, the "baseline  forecast";"  and (c)  uncertainty as 
to the location of  the optimum value of  the target variable. l2 
The point is clear. The policymaker's estimates of the current values of y. 
x,  or  p  in his country could easily be off by several percentage points in either 
direction, which could flip the signs of the corresponding three terms-any  one 
of which could change the sign of the derivative of the objective function-in 
each of equations (2)-(5).  Thus it is entirely possible that the country could 
ask its partners in negotiations to expand, or that it could agree to a partner's 
request  that  it itself  expand, when these  changes would  in  fact  move  the 
economy in the wrong direction. 
To  take one historical example, in the late  1970s the U.S. policymakers, 
looking at the available economic data, concluded that insufficient growth in 
the world economy was the problem of the time. This assumption was the basis 
of the 1978 Bonn Summit agreement for coordinated expansion with Japan and 
Europe, the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany in particular.  By the end of the 
decade, the consensus had become that fighting inflation was the top priority, 
not accelerating real growth. A natural way of  interpreting the view-widely 117  Obstacles to Coordination 
held in Germany at least-that  the results of the Bonn coordinated expansion 
turned out in retrospect to have been detrimental is to  say that unanticipated 
developments,  particularly the large increase in oil prices associated with the 
sudden  Iranian  crisis  of  1979,  moved  the  world  economy  to  a  highly 
inflationary position where expansion was no longer called for. l3 
The second  sort  of  uncertainty  present  in  the  equations  is  uncertainty 
regarding the proper weights w,  and wp  to put on the target variables in the 
objective function.  l4  This issue is even more subjective than the issue of  the 
optimal values of  the target  variables.  In a society where  the  weights  that 
individual actors place on inflation (or the current account) vary from zero to 
infinity, the likelihood must be judged very high that any given government is 
using weights that differ from the “correct”  ones that would follow from any 
given criterion. One can see from the equations that putting insufficient weight 
on fighting inflation, for example, can have the same effect as underestimating 
the baseline inflation rate: the policymaker in coordination exercises may ask 
his  trading  partners  to  adopt  expansionary  policies  when  contractionary 
policies are in fact called for. This is precisely the mistake that by 1980 some 
concluded had been  made by  the United  States. From the viewpoint of the 
Republicans who were elected  to the presidency  in that year,  or the  Social 
Democrats who came to power in Germany soon thereafter, the policymakers 
who had agreed to coordinated reflation at the Bonn Summit of 1978 had put 
insufficient weight on the objective of price stability. 
The  third  sort  of  uncertainty  pertains  to  the  policy  multipliers,  the 
derivatives ym,  yg, etc., in equations (2)-(5’), telling the effect of changes in 
the money supply and government expenditure on the target variables.  Any 
given government is likely to be using policy multipliers that differ substan- 
tially from the “true”  ones, and that may even be incorrect in sign. One way 
of  seeing this is to note the tremendous variation in multipliers according to 
different schools of thought, or even according to different estimates in models 
of  “mainstream”  macroeconomists.  They cannot all be correct, and it seems 
highly probable that no single model is in fact exactly right.Is 
It is possible to illustrate the potential range of multiplier estimates in some 
detail.  In  a recent  exercise conducted  at the  Brookings  Institution,  twelve 
leading econometric models of the international macroeconomy simulated the 
effects of  specific policy changes in the United States and in the rest of the 
OECD.I6 The models participating  were the Federal Reserve Board’s Multi- 
country  model, the European  Economic  Community’s  Compact  model, the 
Japanese Economic Planning Agency model, Project Link, Patrick Minford’s 
Liverpool  model,  the  McKibbin-Sachs  Global  model,  the  Sims-Litterman 
VAR  model, the OECD’s Interlink model, John Taylor’s model, the Wharton 
Econometrics model, and the Data Resources, Inc., model. The variation in 
the estimates is large, not just in magnitude but also in sign. The effect of fiscal 
or monetary expansion on domestic output and inflation is usually at least of 
the positive sign that one would expect. (Even here there are exceptions as 118  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
regards  inflation:  the  VAR,  Wharton,  and  Link  models  sometimes show 
expansion causing a reduction in the CPI, probably due to effects via markup 
pricing.) But disagreement  among the models becomes much more common 
when we turn to the international effects. 
The areas of greatest disagreement among the econometric models regarding 
international  transmission  are not  the  same as one might  expect from the 
theoretical literature.  A U.S. fiscal expansion is transmitted positively to the 
rest of  the OECD in ten out of eleven models, and an expansion in the other 
countries  is transmitted  positively  to the  United  States  in  nine  out  of  ten 
models, whereas  in theory fiscal transmission  can easily be negative.  The 
greatest amount of  disagreement  occurs, rather, on the effect of a monetary 
expansion  on the domestic current  account,  and  therefore  on  the  foreign 
current account and output level. There are two conflicting effects. On the one 
hand, the monetary expansion raises income and therefore  imports. On the 
other  hand,  it  depreciates  the currency,  which  tends  to improve the trade 
balance. (In the Mundell-Fleming  model the net effect on the current account 
must be positive.I8) It turns out that a U.S. monetary expansion worsens the 
current account in eight out of eleven models, and a monetary expansion in the 
other OECD countries worsens their current accounts in five out of ten models. 
(In most models the rest of the Mundell-Fleming  transmission  mechanism is 
reversed as well: the foreign current account and foreign income rise rather 
than fall.) 
What happens if U.S., European, and Japanese policymakers  proceed with 
coordination  efforts  despite disagreements such  as these? In  Frankel  and 
Rockett (1986, 1988) and Frankel (1988a), we use the Brookings simulations 
(and  the  welfare  weights  from  Oudiz  and  Sachs  1984) to  consider  the 
possibilities when governments coordinate using conflicting models. Countries 
will in general be able to find a package of coordinated policy changes that each 
believes will leave it better off, even though each has a different view of the 
effects and thus may not understand why the other is willing to go along with 
the  package. The actual  effects depend on what  the true model  is.  If  we 
consider ten possible models, there are 1,000  combinations of models that can 
be  used  to represent  the  beliefs  of  the  U.S. policymakers,  the  beliefs  of 
non-U.S.  policymakers,  and  reality.  We  find  that  monetary  coordination 
results in gains for the United States in 546 cases, losses in 321 cases, and no 
effect  on the objective  functions (to four significant  digits)  in  133 cases. 
Coordination results in gains for the rest of the OECD countries in 539 cases, 
as against losses in 327 and no effect in  134. 
A  number  of  authors  have  taken  exception  to  this  finding  and  to  its 
implication  that  uncertainty  constitutes  a  serious  obstacle  to  successful 
international policy coordination. Holtham and Hughes Hallett ( 1987), Fren- 
kel, Goldstein, and Masson (1988, 31-32),  and Ghosh and Masson (1988a, 
b) argue that, in a world in which different models abound, it is not sensible 
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model.  Such criticisms could be applied to the  original paper,  Frankel and 
Rockett (1986). But extensions in the published Frankel and Rockett (1988, 
337-338)  and Frankel (1988a, 19-21)  papers relax the assumption that each 
policymaker acts as if he or she is certain as to the correct model. Policymakers 
are assumed to assign probability weights to each of the possible models and 
then to maximize their expected welfare. l9 Coordination then turns out to raise 
U.S. welfare in only 20 percent of the cases, and to raise non-U.S.  welfare 
in  60 percent of the cases. 
Ghosh  (1987) and Ghosh  and Masson  (1988) claim that the  presence of 
model  uncertainty-far  from  rendering  coordination  unattractive  as  in  my 
results-actually  furnishes an argument in favor of coordination, provided that 
policymakers recognize that they do not know the true model. Their argument 
is  essentially  that  if  the  policymaker  has  rational  expectations,  then  the 
probability weights he assigns to the possible models (No to each of 10 in our 
experiment) will correspond to the best weights available. This argument is 
correct (1) assuming that governments do in fact assign the best weights to 
alternative models  (which among other things implies that all governments 
share the same perceptions,  which does not seem to be the case), and (2)  as 
a statement about ex ante welfare only.  If governments do not agree on the 
correct set of weights to assign the models, the implications even for correct 
ex  ante  welfare  are  precisely  the  same  as  the  original  implications  of 
disagreement as to the correct model are for true ex post welfare: coordination 
could make the country worse off in expected value. Furthermore, even if the 
countries do know the best weights, it is still quite possible that the true model 
will turn out to lie far from the weighted-average model and coordination will 
reduce  ex post  welfare.  It is ex post  welfare  that  should  be  the  ultimate 
criterion; to argue otherwise essentially would be to argue that what matters 
is that the president blithely perceives that he has made the best decision, even 
if  the consequences for the economy may in fact be calamitous. 
Holtham and Hughes Hallett (1987) and Kenen (1987) argue that we should 
rule out coordination (i.e., that it will not take place) in cases where the bargain 
is  not  “sustainable,”  defined  as cases  where  one  party  expects  that  the 
other-even  though happy to go along with the bargain-will  in fact lose from 
it. The supposition is that the first party will expect the other policymaker to 
abrogate the agreement next period, when the error becomes evident. To this, 
one can make two possible responses. First, one can point out that throughout 
the exercise (that considered by  Holtham and Hughes Hallett 1987, as much 
as by Frankel and Rockett 1988), it is assumed that policymakers do not revise 
their multiplier estimates just because the target variables turn out in the next 
period to take different values from the ones they expected.  (Implicitly, they 
assign the error to a transitory disturbance. This is the alternative to assuming 
that they gradually update their multiplier estimates in a Bayesian way until 
they converge on the true model.*’  It would certainly be foolish to represent 
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model fits perfectly the latest data point.) It follows that it would not be rational 
to expect the other policymaker to abrogate the agreement next period, because 
the other policymaker is known to believe in a model that will continue to make 
the agreement appear advantageous.  It is not as if  the other policymaker will 
be able to accuse the first of bad faith. If the first keeps his promise to set his 
policy instruments in the way agreed upon, it is not his fault if the economy 
responds in an unexpected way. 
The second possible response to the point is to admit that policymakers in 
international negotiations are less likely to reach agreement on a coordination 
package if they have profoundly different views of  the world  and thus have 
difficulty communicating at all. This argument does not change the conclusion 
that uncertainty  constitutes a serious obstacle to successful policy coordina- 
tion.  It  simply reclassifies  some of  the  1,000 combinations  as cases where 
coordination does not even get past the talking stage. And there is nothing to 
guarantee that  those  “sustainable”  cases where the coordination  does take 
place will have a higher incidence of  welfare gains than that reflected in the 
statistics that count all  1,000 cases.21 
Carrying this logic one step further, we can consider the subset of  100 cases 
where  the  two  countries  agree  on  a  single  model.  Again,  this  does  not 
necessarily  improve the chances that the chosen model is the correct one. In 
Frankel and Rockett (1988, 330), for the subset where the countries agree, 
coordination turns out to result in U.S.  gains in 65 percent of the cases, and 
rest-of-world gains in 59 percent of the cases. Holtham and Hughes Hallett 
(1987, 25) reach  a  similar conclusion: judged by  the  correct  model, only 
slightly over half the agreement cases result in gains. 
Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1988, 30-31)  offer some further defenses 
of coordination, these in response to the point made by Oudiz and Sachs (1984) 
and others that the gains from coordination are empirically found to be small, 
even under the normal certainty assumption (which is the best case in that the 
gains  are  necessarily  positive).  First,  they  cite a finding  of  Holtham  and 
Hughes Hallett (1987) that the gains from coordination turn out larger when 
other target variables such as the exchange rate are included in the objective 
function. Against this finding must be balanced the problems that uncertainty 
poses  for choosing  the  exchange rate  as  one  of  the  target  variables;  the 
econometric  record  shows  even  greater  uncertainty  as  to  the  effects  of 
macroeconomic policies on exchange rates than on output, inflation, and the 
trade balance. 
Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson  point  out two  further limitations  of  the 
Oudiz-Sachs (1984) approach: that it does not provide an explicit standard of 
comparison when it pronounces the gains from coordination “small,” and that 
it assumes that the  “counterfactual”  (what would happen in the absence of 
coordination)  is  optimization  by  policymakers  in the  Nash  noncooperative 
equilibrium,  which is not necessarily realistic. These two points are simulta- 
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332, table 7) and Frankel  (1988a, tables  13 and  14). There the gains from 
coordination, under the best-case assumption that the policymaker knows the 
true  model,  are compared  to the  gains  to  a  single policymaker,  who  may 
previously have believed an incorrect model, of discovering the true model and 
unilaterally  adjusting his policies accordingly (while staying within the Nash 
noncooperative equilibrium).  In a majority of cases, the gains from coordi- 
nation are small compared to the gains from a unilateral switch to the correct 
model (nine to six for the U.S. and twelve to four for the rest of the OECD, 
in each case assuming that the partner knows the correct model all along). 
Thus it  remains true that the obstacles to successful coordination are for- 
midable, even in a simplified one-period framework with enforcement assumed 
to be automatic. 
Problems of  Enforcement and the G-7 Indicators 
Coming  from  our  consideration  of  the  problems  of  uncertainty,  several 
conditions  would  seem to  be  essential  for  any  cooperative  agreement  to 
“stick.”  First,  each  round  of  coordination  must  specify  clearly  what  is 
expected of  each party.  It is hard  enough to enforce a clear-cut  agreement 
because each party has an incentive to cheat; enforcement is hopeless if the 
parties  have not  even  spelled out what  is required  of  them.  (When OPEC 
ministers  come out  of  a  Vienna  meeting  without  having  agreed  upon  oil 
production quotas for their countries, it is probably a safe bet that the members 
will not be withholding output in the common interest; enforcement  is hard 
enough even when the agreement is explicit.) 
Second, for the  parties to  be  held  accountable,  the  variables  that  they 
commit to must, to the  maximum  extent possible,  be both observable  and 
under the control of the governmental authorities, and in particular under the 
control of those authorities involved in the international negotiations. It is for 
this reason that when the IMF negotiates a “letter of intent” with the finance 
minister of a borrowing country, the “performance  criteria”  that are agreed 
upon tend to be variables directly under the control of the authorities, such as 
the growth rate of the monetary base, rather than variables that are harder to 
control like the broad money supply, let alone the ultimate target variables likz 
inflation.  Otherwise,  the  national  authorities  could  always  claim  that  a 
subsequent failure to satisfy a performance criterion was beyond their control. 
It is not essential that the variables be under the precise short-run control of 
the authorities, especially if compliance with the agreement is to be checked 
only on a basis of, say, once a year at annual reviews by the IMF (‘  ‘Article IV 
Consultations”) or at summit meetings of the heads of state, or twice a year 
at  meetings  of  the  finance  ministers.  It  is  only  essential  that  there  be  an 
unambiguous sign to the relationship between the policy instruments that are 
under direct control and the variable to which the parties commit, and that the 
lags in the relationship not be too long. When the variable begins to deviate 
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policy instruments accordingly. Then the policymaker at the end of the year 
can be held accountable  for any large deviations from the agreement. 
The third necessary condition pulls the opposite direction from the second. 
The variables that the parties commit to must be closely enough tied to the 
target variables in their ultimate objective function that if there turns out to be 
an unexpected disturbance in one of the economic relationships  (or if one of 
the multipliers belonging to an agreed policy change turns out to be different 
than expected), the country will not be too drastically harmed. If the country 
commits to a specific number for the monetary base or the money supply, and 
there are shifts in the money multiplier or velocity that translate that number 
into a severe and needless recession, it is obvious that the country will break 
its commitment. There must also be a similar link between the variables that 
each party commits to and the other country’s target variables. A country will 
not be as impressed when its partner sticks to  its money growth target if this 
turns out to be disadvantageous to it (for example because a disturbance moves 
it to the overly inflationary side of full employment, or because the partner’s 
money growth turns out to be transmitted  negatively rather than positively). 
At the Tokyo Summit of May 1986, it was decided that the G-5 countries, 
or thenceforth the G-7, would focus in their meetings on a set of ten “objective 
indicators”: the growth rate of GNP,  interest rate, inflation rate, unemploy- 
ment, ratio of  the fiscal deficit to GNP, current account and trade balances, 
money  growth  rate, international  reserve  holdings, and  exchange rate.  No 
pretense was made that the members would rigidly commit to specific numbers 
for these indicators, in the sense that sanctions would be imposed on a country 
if  it deviated far from the values agreed upon. But the plan did include the 
understanding  that appropriate remedial  measures would be taken whenever 
there  developed  significant  deviations  from  the  ‘‘intended  course.”  The 
indicators are viewed as prototypes of  the variables that representatives would 
bargain over if  coordination  were to become more serious. The current G-7 
system could be viewed as an attempted case of the “epsilon-small”  degree 
of coordination mentioned at the beginning of this paper, a necessary stage for 
building confidence before moving on to more binding forms of coordination. 
The list has been further discussed, and trimmed down, at subsequent G-7 
meetings.  By the time of the Venice Summit in June 1987, the list had been 
reduced  to  six  indicators:  growth,  inflation,  trade  balances,  government 
budgets, monetary conditions, and exchange rates.”  Treasury Secretary James 
Baker,  however,  in October  1987 told  the IMF Annual  Meeting that  “the 
United States is prepared to consider utilizing, as an additional indicator in the 
coordination  process, the relationship  among our currencies and a basket of 
commodities, including gold. . . .” At the Toronto Summit of June 1988, “the 
G-7 countries welcomed the addition of a commodity price indicator and the 
progress made toward refining the analytical use of   indicator^."^^ 
The French Finance Minister Edouard Balladur singled out five indicators 
after the G-7 meeting of December 23, 1987 (a “Louvre Agreement 11”). He 
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of the Louvre Agreements.  Their enforcement requires close surveillance of 
each  of  the major  economies  on the  basis  of  such economic  indicators  as 
growth rates, fiscal balance, balance of payments, interest rates, and exchange 
rates. This surveillance is already being established gradually.”24 
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile these optimistic statements that some amount 
of substantive coordination is already taking place with the fact that G-7 meetings 
do not publicly announce the targets agreed to for the indicators. How can any 
pressure be brought to bear on countries that stray from the agreed-upon targets 
(whether it is moral suasion, embarrassment, the effect on long-term reputations, 
or outright sanctions) if the targets themselves are not made 
Indeed, the G-7 guards with tremendous secrecy the values of the indicators, 
even more  so than  the  central  banks  guard  the  secrecy  of  their  foreign- 
exchange market interventions. Theory says that the success of a target zone, 
for exchange rates for example, is enhanced when speculators are made aware 
of  the  boundaries.26 Why  does the  G-7 keep  them  secret?  One possible 
answer-drawn  from the central banker’s, and not the economist’s, view of 
the  financial  markets-is  that  the  G-7  countries  believe  that  short-term 
foreign-exchange speculation is destabilizing,  and that creation of short-term 
uncertainty  as to what the authorities will do is a way of discouraging such 
spe~ulation.~’  Another possible answer is that they do not want to lose face 
when the exchange rate subsequently breaks outside the band. This answer fits 
in  well  with  one’s  suspicion  that  the  G-7 meetings  may  in  fact  reach  no 
substantive agreements, but  find it politically useful to issue communiquis 
nevertheless; the communiquks are sufficiently  vague that each member can 
interpret them to his own advantage.28 
The G-7 list  of  indicators  is  not  especially  well-suited  to the  desirable 
conditions for workable coordination stated above. It is difficult to imagine a 
G-7  meeting  applying  moral  censure  to  one of  its  members  for  having 
experienced a higher rate of real growth during the year than had been agreed 
upon in the preceding meeting, or a lower rate of inflation. 
The main problem with the list is that it is too long to be practical. When 
each country has ten indicators but only two or three policy instruments, it is 
virtually certain that the indicators will give conflicting signals and that tt-e 
national authorities  will feel no constraint on their setting of policy  instru- 
ments. Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1988, 22) note that one argument in 
favor of choosing a single indicator is the point that when multiple indicators 
send conflicting signals, authorities can hide behind the confusion. They also 
observe that multiple indicators can encourage “overcoordination: ” setting a 
single indicator allows each country to retain some degree of freedom in setting 
its monetary and fiscal policies.  In this light, a serious coordination scheme 
might begin in the 1990s by setting only one indicator, and then only progress 
to commitments to multiple variables when and if sufficient political consensus 
and confidence has developed to justify that degree of sacrifice of sovereignty. 
Perhaps the true list has been, or will  be, winnowed  down  to a smaller 
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variable on which negotiation under a future coordination regime would focus. 
Each would seem to be dominated by nominal GNP (or nominal demand). We 
consider  each  in  turn.  Real  output,  employment,  inflation,  and  the  trade 
balance are less directly affected by policy instruments than is nominal GNP, 
aside from the fact that focusing exclusively on any one would destabilize the 
others. The money supply is more under the control of the authorities (at least 
on an annual basis), but is much less directly linked to target variables: it is 
one unambiguous step further away from the two fundamental target variables 
of real output and the price level than is nominal GNP (that step, of course, 
being  the  existence  of  shifts  in  velocity,  as  discussed  in  sec.  2.1  and 
demonstrated in the Appendix). Furthermore we saw in the preceding section 
that the effects of money on all three target variables (output, price level, and 
trade balance) in the other country are completely ambiguous in sign. Thus it 
is an even less suitable choice of  focus for international coordination than for 
domestic policymaking. 
Fiscal policy is more easily linked to the foreign target variables (or would 
be, if the high-employment  deficit were used as the indicator).  But it is less 
directly  under the control  of  the policymakers  than  is  the  money  supply. 
Among (3-7 countries, the inability to control the budget deficit has been most 
striking in the case of  the United  States in the 1980s. Feldstein  (1988,  10) 
offers a reason why the United States will never be able to participate in serious 
international bargaining over fiscal policy: 
A primary  reason  why  such macroeconomic policy  coordination  cannot 
work as envisioned is that the United States is constitutionally incapable of 
participating  in  such  a  negotiation.  The  separation  of  powers  in  the 
American  form of  government means that the  Secretary  of  the Treasury 
cannot promise to reduce or expand the budget deficit or to change tax rules. 
This power does not rest with the President or the administration but depends 
on a legislative agreement between the President and the Congress. 
Exchange rate policy is of course a very large topic in itself, to be considered 
briefly in the last part of this paper. But we can note some difficulties with the 
exchange rate being the single indicator that G-7 countries commit to in policy 
coordination  agreements. If the dolladmark rate begins  to stray  outside the 
announced target zone, which of the two governments should suffer sanctions 
or a loss in reputation? The ‘‘rz -  1” problem means that one country would 
have to sit out, presumably the United States, which is not what is wanted.29 
Countries  could commit to certain targets for their  foreign-exchange inter- 
vention, or more generally  to monetary  and fiscal policies, which in theory 
would  determine the exchange rate. But-as  already  noted-the  link from 
macroeconomic policies  to the  exchange rate is fraught  with  even greater 
uncertainty than the link to output and inflation, even if one were to assume 
that the exchange rate might have as great a claim to being in the objective 
function as the other target variables. 
In the second part of the Appendix to this paper, the exchange rate is added 
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that the penalty  that goes with stabilizing the exchange rate is to be saddled 
with a monetary  policy that destabilizes the overall price level, relative to a 
regime of stabilizing nominal GNP. Within this framework, to opt for a fixed 
exchange rate regime, one has to put tremendous weight on the exchange rate 
objective. (One has to be prepared to argue that a 10 percent fluctuation in the 
exchange rate causes greater trouble than a 10 percent fluctuation in the price 
level.) The only other way out would be to assume that much of the disturbance 
in the exchange rate equation will disappear when the regime changes, rather 
than having to be accommodated by the money  upp ply.^" If we were to make 
the more practical comparison of exchange rate target zones with nominal GNP 
target zones, rather than literally fixed exchange rates with fixed nominal GNP, 
the advantages of INT would be further boosted by the accountability point: 
if  a country’s exchange rate  strays outside  the  target zone to which  it  has 
committed itself, it can always claim that the movement is beyond its control. 
Such claims would be completely credible, in light of the large disturbances 
in the exchange rate equation. 
As for the  remaining  three  indicators  on  the  G-7 list, the  interest  rate, 
international reserves, and the price of gold, the last is the only one that has 
been  proposed  as a candidate  for the sole variable  around  which  countries 
should  coordinate.  Proponents  of  a  central  role  for gold  do not  seem to 
appreciate the analytical point that shifts in the demand function for gold, and 
in the other economic relationships that link it to the target variables that we 
ultimately  care about, are even more unstable than shifts in the demand for 
money or the demand for foreign exchange, and are likely to remain so in the 
future. 
This does not mean that the price of gold and other commodities is not a 
good indicator, in the sense of an early warning signal as to the likely future 
course of a true target variable, namely the overall price level.31  In this sense 
it belongs with the money supply, the interest rate, and the yield curve, and 
many other leading indicators, on the list of variables that policymakers may 
want to monitor on a short-term basis in attempting to hit their targets, whether 
under a regime of coordination (e.g., international nominal GNP targeting), 
decentralized  national  policymaking  with  some commitment  to  a  nominal 
anchor (e.g., regular nominal GNP targeting),  or complete discretion. 
In  short, if  coordination  is to begin-on  a scale that  is small, but  goes 
beyond the stage of mere rhetoric-by  some degree of commitment to a single 
variable,  then nominal GNP (or nominal demand) would  seem to dominate 
each of the eleven indicators that the (3-7 has apparently been discussing as the 
natural candidate for that variable. 
Problems of  Inpation-fighting Credibility 
The  third  of  the  existing  critiques  of  international  coordination,  after 
problems of uncertainty and problems of enforcement and political practical- 
ity,  is  the  point  made  by  Ken  Rogoff  (1985a):  if  governments  set  up  the 
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equilibrium in each period is likely to entail a greater degree of expansion, and 
thereby in the long run undermine  the governments’ inflation-fighting credi- 
bility, and to result in a higher inflation rate for a given level of output. In the 
Rogoff view, renouncing the machinery of coordination is one of the ways that 
governments can credibly precommit  to less inflationary paths. 
It  is important to realize  that  the  introduction  of  longer-term  issues  of 
credibility, time inconsistency,  and precommitment  can just as easily run in 
favor of coordination as against it.32 If the perceived externality or shortcom- 
ing of  the Nash noncooperative equilibrium is that it is overly expansionary, 
then the coordination equilibrium, even when arrived at on a period-by-period 
basis, will entail less expansion, not more. This is often argued to be the basis 
underlying  the EMS.  The rhetoric  that  Chancellor Schmidt and  President 
Giscard  d’Estaing originally  used  in proposing  the  EMS in  the  late  1970s 
suggested that they were doing so because the United States was neglecting its 
duty to supply to the world the public good of  a stable, noninflating, currency. 
Ten years later, many observers of the EMS have decided that its success lies 
precisely in giving inflation-prone countries  like Italy and France  a credible 
nominal anchor for their monetary policies.33  Committing to an exchange rate 
parity  or band  vis-a-vis  a hard-currency  country like  Germany constitutes 
precisely the sort of time-consistent  low-inflation policy sought by those who 
worry  that  central  bankers  left  to  their  own  discretion  will  be  overly 
expansionary. 
In the case of the EMS, there is an asymmetry. It is accepted that Germany 
is simply known to place very large weight on price stability, due to its history 
or for whatever other reasons. The weaker-currency countries can then peg to 
the “greater mark area,” if they wish to import inflation-fighting credibility. 
(There is a close analogy with the idea in Rogoff  1985b that if  a particular 
individual-say  Paul  Volcker-is  known  to  have  an  extreme  aversion  to 
inflation, then the country can gain by appointing him as central banker, even 
if  the country’s objective function puts less weight on fighting inflation; his 
tight-money credibility will reduce the public’s expectations of inflation, and 
in long-run equilibrium will produce a lower level of actual inflation for any 
given level of  output.) In the case of proposals  for worldwide coordination, 
there  is  no presumption  that  the United  States (the natural  “Stackleberg” 
leader) in fact has as much inflation-fighting credibility as Germany and Japan. 
Thus there is no automatic presumption that year-by-year coordination would 
lower the average world inflation rate rather than raise it. 
The implication of the credibility issue is that a scheme for coordination is 
more  likely  in  the  long  run  to produce gains  if  the  plan  has the  national 
governments making, not just commitments to  each other on a  period-by- 
period basis, but also some degree of commitment to a nominal anchor on a 
longer-term basis.  Hence the arguments for coordinating around the price of 
gold  (by  James Baker,  Robert  Mundell,  and others)  or around the  global 
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the closed-economy context (discussed in sec. 3.2.  I), as to why nominal GNP 
as a nominal anchor dominates the money supply,  price of gold, or overall 
price level, apply equally to the world economy. 
3.2.3  How International Nominal GNP Targeting (INT) Would Work 
The INT framework laid out in Frankel (1988c,d) is a very simple one. The 
G-7 would put aside their list of ten  indicators and would instead focus on 
nominal demand (defined as nominal GNP minus the balance on goods and 
services).  At  each  meeting,  the  national  authorities  would  (a)  commit 
themselves,  without any obsessively great degree of firmness, to target rates 
of growth, or ranges, for their countries’ levels of  nominal demand for five 
years  into the  future, and  (b)  commit themselves,  with  somewhat  greater 
firmness, to targets for the coming year. In the first stage,  that is, the early 
1990s, there would be no explicit enforcement  mechanism.  But the targets 
would be publicly announced,  and if  a country’s rate of growth of  nominal 
demand turned out to err significantly  in one direction or the other, the fact 
would be noted disapprovingly at the next G-7 meeting. This does not happen 
under the current system. If the first stage were successful, a future stage might 
add another variable or two to the list, or might even commit countries firmly 
to specific policy responses in the event that their level of  nominal demand 
begins to stray from the year’s target. 
A plan that called for targeting nominal GNP rather than nominal demand 
might be more readily and more widely  understood,  and thus might stand a 
better chance of succeeding politically. The advantage of focusing on nominal 
demand  is  the  assumption  that  when  the  cooperative  equilibrium  entails 
expansion, countries need to be discouraged from the temptation to accomplish 
the expansion  of output  through  net  foreign demand, for example  through 
protectionist trade measures, as opposed to domestic demand. In some years 
the cooperative equilibrium may entail contraction rather than expansion, and 
then a nominal GNP target might be preferable to a nominal demand target. 
But  it  is  usually  thought  that  the  political  pressure  for protectionist  trade 
remedies is greater in recessions than in expansions ,34 which points to nominal 
demand as the superior choice.35 
Countries  could  attain  their  nominal  GNP  or  nominal  demand  targets 
through any of several routes. One possibility, for example, is the Williamson- 
Miller (1987)  “blueprint”,  which  assigns  fiscal policy  in  each country the 
responsibility  for attaining a nominal demand target  (and assigns monetary 
policy in each country responsibility for the exchange rate36). But at least one 
serious  problem  arises  if  fiscal  policy  is  explicitly  specified  as the  policy 
instrument with which countries are expected to attain the nominal demand 
targets that they agreed to. When their economies stray away from the target, 
the authorities will claim that it is not politically possible to adjust fiscal policy 
quickly.  Such claims will be completely credible because they will generally 
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An agreement is more likely to stick if monetary policy, rather than fiscal 
policy, is specified as the policy instrument that countries are expected to use. 
Even if  fiscal policy  is assumed to be no more  subject to lags and political 
encumbrances than is monetary policy, there  is another reason for assigning 
monetary policy to the nominal demand target. If countries also pursue trade 
balance targets (and it seems that they do, whether or not they should), then 
the classic  “assignment problem”  is relevant.  The general rule is to  assign 
responsibility for the trade balance target to that policy instrument which has 
a relatively greater effect on it (Mundell 1962). I agree with Boughton (1989) 
that  under  modem  conditions  of  floating  exchange rates,  which  work  to 
decrease the effectiveness of monetary policy with respect to the trade balance 
and  increase  the effectiveness of  fiscal  policy,  this  means assigning  fiscal 
policy to the trade balance target and monetary policy to the domestic target. 
What is the precise instrument of monetary policy that should be adjusted 
when nominal demand drifts away from the target? The monetary base or level 
of unborrowed reserves would be better than the broader monetary aggregates 
because the central bank controls them more directly. (The short-term interest 
rate is another possible instrument.) McCallum (1988b, 15) has suggested a 
specific  feedback  rule in the context of  closed-economy  policymaking  that 
might do well here. His proposal is that for each 1 percent that nominal GNP 
deviates from its target in a given quarter, the monetary base be expanded an 
additional 0.25 percent over the subsequent quarter. He suggests setting a trend 
growth rate in the target of 3 percent per year, and subtracting from this the 
average  growth  rate  of  base  velocity  over  the  preceding  four  years.  An 
alternative possibility would be to replace the 3 percent target with “a number 
to be negotiated for each member of the G-7 each year, with a planned long-run 
tendency of 3 percent.” 
The central bank would be better able to hit its annual nominal demand target 
if  it were allowed to respond to other available information, besides just the 
most recent monthly figure for nominal demand itself. Ben Friedman (1984, 
183-84),  for example, shows that such indicators as the money supply and the 
stock  of  credit  can be  used  to predict  more accurately  deviations from a 
nominal income target. Many other “leading indicators” could be added to the 
list. The conclusion seems to be that it would be better in practice to leave the 
means of attaining the nominal demand target up to the national authorities, 
rather than require that they follow a particular rule like McCallum’s (1987). 
It might be objected that this entire discussion of coordination via INT has 
neglected important questions of the mix between monetary and fiscal policy, 
the  real  interest  rate, and the  exchange rate.38 These questions are  briefly 
considered  next. 
3.3  Policy Independence and Exchange Rate Flexibility 
One measure of  the degree of macroeconomic  policy convergence  among 
countries  is  the  magnitude  and  variability  of  the  real  interest  differential. 129  Obstacles to Coordination 
Rogoff  (1985~)  for example  shows that real  interest rates are not perfectly 
correlated across European countries, and argues that this shows that European 
countries retain some policy independence. One question, posed by observers 
of the EMS in particular, is whether such independence is attributable to capital 
controls and other remaining barriers to the free movement of capital across 
national boundaries, or whether it is attributable to exchange rate fle~ibility.~~ 
3.3.1  Financial Integration,  Monetary Integration,  and Independence 
Frankel and MacArthur (1  988) studied real interest differentials for twenty- 
four countries,  from  1982 up to early  1987, and decomposed  them into a 
component  attributable to imperfect financial  integration (the “country pre- 
mium”)  and  a  component  attributable  to  exchange  rate  variability  (the 
“currency  premium”). Table 3.1 shows real interest differentials for twenty- 
five countries,  vis-%-vis the  Eurodollar,  updated  through  the  beginning  of 
1988. (It is taken from Frankel  1989.) Both the mean of the differential and 
the  measures  of  variability  show substantial  independence  for each  of  the 
countries.  Table 3.2 uses  forward  exchange rate  data  for each  currency  to 
separate out the covered interest differential, which represents the component 
due to imperfect financial integration. The covered interest differential is very 
small for the G-10 countries  (including Switzerland) except for France and 
Italy, and is also very small for Austria, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Even for 
the  other  countries, which  often  have  significant  barriers  to  international 
financial integration, the country premium is in most cases smaller than the 
currency premium. This says that for the major countries, and many others as 
well, exchange rate variability is a greater source of policy independence than 
is imperfect financial integration. 
Different views are possible on whether or not policy independence makes 
for  a  more  smoothly-running  world  economy.  Corden  (1983)  argues  that 
decentralized  decision-making  among countries  is  more  efficient,  because 
each country knows better its own situation. His is an argument in favor of the 
current floating-rate system. McKinnon (1988), on the other hand, takes it for 
granted  that  world  economic  efficiency  requires  that  real  interest  rates  be 
equalized across countries (presumably so that the marginal product of capital 
is equalized across countries).  His is an argument in favor of  reform of the 
system so as to reduce exchange rate variability. 
3.3.2  A Proposal for Beginning to Stabilize Exchange Rates: The 
“Hosomi Fund” 
Would-be reformers of  the world monetary  system have a choice.  If they 
wish to allow each country enhanced policy independence,  they can seek to 
decrease the degree of financial market integration. Alternatively, like McKin- 
non (1984, 1988) and Williamson (1983), they can opt for increased policy 
convergence  and  exchange rate  stability.  (Frenkel,  Goldstein,  and  Masson 
1988 refer to a choice between decreasing the demand for policy  coordina- 
tion  and increasing the supply.) Frankel (1988b) considers one of the most 130  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
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mentioned  proposals  for decreasing  the degree of  financial integration, the 
“Tobin  tax”  on foreign-exchange transactions.  Here I  discuss another par- 
ticular proposal that others have made for stabilizing exchange rates .40 
Several years ago, Takashi Hosomi (1985) proposed the creation of a new 
supranational  fund that  could intervene in  foreign-exchange  markets. The 
Japanese Vice-Minister  of Finance for International  Affairs, Toy00 Gyoten, 
has recently  floated precisely  this  sort of  propo~al.~’  Some recent talk of a 
European Central Bank, heard both in official and academic circles, strikes a 
similar note.42 
The proposal envisions a fund that could undertake operations in the open 
international markets, but would not replace the individual countries’ central 
banks. A plausible motivation for this approach is precisely the one presented 
in the introduction to this paper: the need for proposals for monetary reform 
that are politically practical  in that they could begin on a very small scale, 
gradually build up confidence among the players, and then increase the scale 
of coordination accordingly. In this case, the size of the fund constitutes the 
variable that would begin with a small “epsilon”  and subsequently increase 
to reflect however much political consensus exists. 
Decisions  could  be  made by  an  “Open  Market Committee”  consisting 
primarily of  representatives  of the individual central banks, with votes pre- 
sumably awarded in proportion to the size of their economies or the size of their 
contribution of international reserves to the fund, as is the case with the IMF, 
but with operations decided by a median voter rule. (The Bank for International 
Settlements [BIS] could also serve as a model; indeed it is conceivable that an 
expanded  BIS could  serve,  in  place  of  founding yet  another  international 
institution.) In the event that France, say, wishes to dampen depreciation of the 
franc against the dollar  but is outvoted by a majority in favor of dollar purchases, 
the Bank of France is still free to intervene in the opposite direction on its own. 
Countries will at first be giving up very little sovereignty when they agree to 
the establishment of such a fund because it will be on a small scale. Only if 
all parties are happy with the outcome would the size of the portfolio-and 
therefore the potential loss of national sovereignty-be  increased. 
3.4  Conclusion 
This paper  has  examined two possible  reforms of  the  world  monetary 
system.  Both  are  designed  to  try  to  overcome  the  serious  obstacles  to 
successful coordination that are outlined in section 3.2.2.  In particular,  both 
are designed in such a way that they can begin on a small scale, and then grow 
as the degree of political consensus grows. 
The INT proposal is appropriate  if the shortcoming of the Nash noncoop- 
erative equilibrium is thought to be either insufficient or excessive expansion. 
The Hosomi proposal is appropriate if the shortcoming is thought to lie with 
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whether  they  can  be  implemented  simultaneously  if  the  noncooperative 
equilibrium is thought to be characterized by both sorts of shortcomings. 
If the Hosomi Fund is foreseen to affect exchange rates only via changes in 
money  supplies, and monetary policy  is also foreseen to be the  instrument 
whereby countries attain their nominal demand targets, it might seem that there 
is an overdeterminacy in the system. But I am not sure that there is in fact a 
problem.  There are some obvious  policy  instruments  that  would  introduce 
extra  degrees of  freedom  into the  system: the  Hosomi Fund’s  intervention 
could be nonsterilized, thus changing the international supplies of bonds rather 
than  supplies of  money,  or the countries  could  use fiscal  policy  alongside 
monetary policy to attain their nominal demand targets. 
Even if money supplies are the only available policy instruments, there are 
n money  supplies to be determined and n national opinions as to what they 
should be. So it sounds like there is no overdeterminacy problem. At any given 
time, the  median  voter  on the  International  Open Market  Committee  will 
simply receive extra weight in determining what the money supplies will be. 
It is true that if the median voter wants the fund to buy a particular currency 
to increase its exchange value, at the same time that the country in question 
is  obligated  to increase  its  monetary  base  in  order to  correct  slower  than 
targeted  growth  in  its  nominal  GNP,  then  the  country  will  be  put  in  an 
untenable  position.  It  seems  unlikely  that  the  International  Open  Market 
Committee would choose to “pick on” a particular member in this way. But 
this is merely speculation at this stage. It would be desirable for future research 
to study the implications of such a Hosomi Fund with a median voter rule, just 
as it would be desirable for future research to study a regime of cooperative 
ex ante setting of nominal demand targets. This paper has only tried to point 
the way, with an examination of some advantages of these two approaches. 
Appendix 
In  this  appendix  we  compare  four  possible  policy  regimes:  (1)  floating 
exchange  rates, with  full  discretion  by  national  policymakers  (the current 
regime),  (2) a rigid  money supply rule, (3)  a rigid  nominal GNP rule,  and 
(4) a rigid exchange rate rule. (In the case of each of the three possible nominal 
anchors,  proponents  sometimes  have  in  mind  a  target  zone  system;  the 
assumption of  a rigid  rule just makes the analysis simpler.) The approach, 
incorporating  the  advantages  both  to  rules  and  discretion,  follows  Rogoff 
(1985b) and Fischer (1988a), who in turn follow Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
Throughout, we assume an aggregate supply relationship: 
(All  y  = y”  + b(p -  p‘) + u, 134  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
where y represents output, y* potential output, p the price level, p'  the expected 
price level (or they could be the actual and expected inflation rates, respec- 
tively),  and u a supply disturbance, with all variables expressed as logs. 
Output and the Price Level in the Objective Function 
We begin without the exchange rate. The loss function is simply: 
('42)  L  = ap2 + (y - ky*j2, 
where a is the weight assigned to the inflation objective, and we assume that 
the  lagged  or expected price  level  relative  to  which p  is measured  can  be 
normalized to zero. We impose k > 1, which builds in an expansionary bias 
to discretionary  policymaking. 
('43)  L  = ap2 + [y*(l -  k)  + b(p -  p')  + .I2. 
1. Discretionary Policy 
demand so as to minimize that period's L, with p'  given: 
Under  full  discretion,  the  policymaker  each  period  chooses  aggregate 
(A4) 
('45) 
Under rational expectations, 
('46) 
So we can solve (A5) for the price level: 
(A71  p  =  -y*(l  - k)[b/a] - ub/[a + b2]. 
From (A2), the expected loss function then works out to: 
(AS)  EL = (1 + b2/a)[y*(l -  k)I2 + [a/(a + b2)]  var(u1. 
The first term represents the inflationary bias in the system, while the second 
represents the effect of the supply disturbance after the authorities have chosen 
the optimal split between inflation and output. 
(Y2)  dL/dp = ap + [y*(l -  k) + b(p -  p')  + u]b = 0; 
p  = [-y*(1  - k)b + b2pe - bu] / [a + b2]. 
pe = Ep = -y*(l  - k)bla. 
2. Money Rule 
To consider alternative regimes, we must be explicit about the money market 
equilibrium condition (in case  1,  it was implicit that the money supply rn was 
the variable that the authorities were using to control demand): 
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where v represents velocity shocks. (We assume v uncorrelated with u.)  If the 
authorities precommit to a fixed money growth rule in order to reduce expected 
inflation in long-run equilibrium, then they must give up on affecting y. The 
optimal money growth rate is the one that sets Ep at the target value for p, 
namely 0. Thus they will set the money supply m at Ey, which in this case is 
y*. The aggregate demand equation thus becomes 
(A101 
Combining  with the aggregate  supply relationship  (Al), the  equilibrium  is 
given by 
p  + y  = y* + v. 
(All)  y  = y*  +  (U + bv)/(l + b),  p  = (V - ~)/(l  + b) 
Substituting into (A2), the expected loss function is 
(A12) 
The first term is smaller than the corresponding  term in the discretion case, 
because the precommitment reduces expected inflation; but the second term is 
probably larger, because the authorities have given up the ability to respond to 
money demand shocks. Which regime is better depends on how big the shocks 
are, and how big a weight (a)  is placed on inflation fighting. 
3. Nominal GNP Rule 
EL = (1 -  k)2y*2  + [(l + a)var(u) + (a + b2)var(v)]/(l  + b)2. 
In the case of  a nominal GNP rule, the authorities vary the money supply 
in such a way as to accommodate velocity shocks. Equation (A10) is replaced 
by the condition that p  + y is constant. The solution is the same as in case 2, 
but with  the  v  disturbance dropped. Thus the expected  loss collapses from 
equation (A12) to 
(A131  EL  = (I ~  k)2y*’ + [(I + a)/(l  + b)2]var(u) 
This unambiguously dominates the money rule case. It is still not possible, 
without knowing var(u), or (a),  to say that the rule dominates discretion. It is 
quite likely,  especially  if  the  variance of  u  is large,  that an absolute  com- 
mitment  to a rule would be unwisely constraining.  Hence the argument for 
a target zone rather than a single number, and for subjecting the central bank 
chairman to a mere loss of reputation rather than a firing squad if he misses 
the target. But it seems clear that, to whatever extent the country chooses to 
commit to a nominal anchor, nominal GNP dominates the money supply as the 
candidate for anchor. 
Adding the Exchange Rate to the Objective Function 
We reconsider here a likely objection to choosing nominal GNP or nominal 
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rate. The alternative of setting monetary policy so as to stabilize the exchange rate 
will not look attractive unless the exchange rate enters the objective function, 
perhaps indirectly via the consumer price index or the trade balance.  Here we 
confront the argument head on and include the exchange rate directly in the loss 
function along with output and the price level. Thus we replace (A2) with 
where s is the spot exchange rate measured relative to some equilibrium  or 
target value and c is the weight placed on exchange rate stability per se. 
There is no point in specifying an elaborate model of  the exchange rate. All 
the empirical results say that most of the variation in the exchange rate cannot 
be  explained  (even  ex post; we say  nothing  of  prediction)  by  measurable 
macroeconomic variables, and thus can only be attributed to an error term that 
we  here  call  e. But  we  must  include  the  money  supply  in  the  equation; 
otherwise  we  do not  allow  the  authorities  the possibility  of  affecting  the 
exchange rate. Our equation is simply 
(We assume that  e is uncorrelated  with the other disturbances.) From (A9), 
We  assume that the same aggregate supply relationship,  equation (A  I), holds 
as before.  So we can write the loss function (A14) as: 
(A17)  L  = up2 + [(l -  k)y* + b(p -  p') + u]* + c(p  ~  v  + el2. 
We  proceed as before to consider possible regimes. 
1. Discretionary Policy 
(Y2)  dL/dp = up + [y* (1 - k) + b(p -  p') + u]b + c(p -  v + e)  = 0. 
(A18)  p  = [-y*(l  -  k)b + b2p'  - bu  + c(v -  e)]  /  (a  + b2 + c). 
The rationally expected p  is given by py = Ep. 
('419)  p'  =  -(1  -  k)by*/(a  + c). 
Substituting into equation (A19) yields 
(A20)  p  = -  (1 - k)y*[b/(a + c)]  + [c(v -  e) -  bu]/(a  + b2 + c). 137  Obstacles to Coordination 
The loss function is 
(A21)  EL = [(I -  k)y*I2 (a + b2 + c)/(a  + c)+  {(a + c)var(u) 
+ c(a + b2)  [var(v) + var(e)]}/(a + b2 + c). 
2.  Money Rule 
As when we considered a money rule before, so that expected inflation is zero, 
the authorities set m at y* and (A10) applies. Thus the same solution (All) for 
y  and p  also applies. The exchange rate is given by substituting the solution 
for p  from (A1  1) into (A16): 
(A221  s =  e - [(u + bv)/(l  + b)] 
The additional s term is the only difference from (A12) in the expected loss 
function: 
(A23)  EL = [y*(l - k)12 + [(l + u  + c)/(l  + b2)]  var(u) 
+ [(a  + b2 + cb2)/(1  + b)2]var(v) + (c)var(e). 
Again the comparison with discretion depends on the various magnitudes. 
3. Nominal GNP Rule 
When the monetary  authorities  are able to vary  rn so as to  keep p  + y 
constant, the velocity shocks v drop out. The expected loss function becomes 
(A24)  EL  = [ y*(l -  k)]* + [(I + a  + c)/(l + b)2]  var(u) + c var(e). 
As before, the nominal GNP rule unambiguously  dominates the money rule. 
In practice,the e shocks in the exchange rate equation are very large. They 
certainly dwarf the u shocks in the aggregate supply equation. (The exchange 
rate often moves 10 percent in a year, without corresponding movements in the 
money  supply or other observable macroeconomic variables;  try to imagine 
similar movements of real output.) If the weight c on the s target is substantial, 
then the last term in the expected loss equation  may be important. 
4.  Exchange Rate Rule 
Again, the authorities cannot affect y in long-run equilibrium. But now it is 
the exchange rate that they peg in such a way that Ep = 0, which from (A16) 
is s = 0. The ex post price level is then given by 




y  = y*  + b(v -  e)  + u. 
(A27)  EL = (a + b2)var(v - e) + [y* (1 -  k)I2 + var(u). 
The coefficient on var (e)  is (a  +  b2),  as compared to the coefficient c in the 
expected loss equation (A24) under the nominal GNP  rule. We made the point above 
that e shocks in practice dwarf u shocks. Reasoning on this basis, even if v shocks 
are also small and a = c (the objective function puts no greater weight on a 10 
percent fluctuation of the price level than on a 10 percent fluctuation  of the exchange 
rate), which is extremely conservative, the expected loss from fixing s is greater 
than the expected loss from fixing nominal GNP.  The reason is that, under an 
exchange rate rule, e shocks are allowed to affect the money supply and therefore 
the overall price level. Once we allow for v shocks (which are probably in between 
u and e shocks in magnitude), the case for nominal GNP targeting is even stronger. 
One would have to put extraordinarily high weight on the exchange rate objective 
to prefer an exchange rate rule. 
Notes 
1.  Fischer (l988b) surveys much of the coordination literature. 
2.  Levine, Currie, and Gaines (1989) present a general methodology for analyzing 
the sustainability of coordination agreements that take the form of simple rules. 
3. The  INT proposal  appears  in brief  form  in  Frankel  (1988~).  Frankel  (1990) 
offers a version of the proposal of the same length as the present paper. 
4.  If  the  problem  with  the  Nash  noncooperative  equilibrium  is  thought  to  be 
competitive appreciation or depreciation,  then an agreement to move to a regime of 
greater exchange rate stability will solve the problem. If, on the other hand, the problem 
is thought to be overly contractionary or overly expansionary monetary policy, then 
such a switch in regimes  may exacerbate  the problem by  increasing the  degree of 
international transmission of disturbances. 
5. While Milton Friedman has justifiably had more influence on this issue than one 
human being is usually able to have, there have long been two aspects of his campaign 
against  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  that  are  puzzling.  First,  his  argument  against 
discretion in monetary policymaking is largely based on the analysis in Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) that the Federal Reserve made the Depression of the  1930s much 
worse than it otherwise would have been by  “allowing”  the MI money supply to fall. 
Yet in recent decades he has campaigned for the Federal Reserve to do precisely what 
he accuses them of  doing in  the 1930s: set a firm target for the monetary base rather 
than for M1. The second, even more puzzling, aspect is that Friedman and his fellow 
monetarists claim to believe that U.S.  money growth would be slower and more stable 
if  monetary policy  were placed more  under  the control of  the democratic  political 
process, via the Treasury or the U.S. Congress, than under the control of elitist control 
bankers like Paul Volcker. It is particularly ironic that, when a member of the monetarist 
Shadow Open Market Committee finally became Treasury Under-secretary for Monetary 
Affairs in the early 1980s, his view that the money growth rate was dangerously high 139  Obstacles to Coordination 
was overruled by  a Treasury Secretary and White House who sought to pressure the 
Federal Reserve for faster money growth leading up to the  1984 election. 
6.  Rogoff (1985b) shows that some intermediate degree of  commitment to a target 
is optimal for monetary policy. 
7.  Gordon (1985). Hall (1985), Taylor (1985), and McCallum (1987, 1988a,b), for 
example, argue in favor of targeting nominal GNP in the closed economy context. The 
idea also has proponents in the United Kingdom: Bean (1983), Meade (1984), and 
Brittan (1987). Williamson and Miller (1987,7- 10) propose targeting nominal demand 
as part of their “blueprint”  for exchange rate target zones. 
8. In 1974, Switzerland can be given as an example of a country that chose to take 
the adverse supply shock almost entirely in the form of lost income and employment 
in order to restore price stability; Sweden, as an example of a country that chose to take 
it almost entirely in the form of inflation in order to preserve output and employment; 
and the United States, as an example in between. 
9.  Holtham  and  Hughes  Hallett  (1987,  130) agree:  “Economists  have perhaps 
focused on moral hazard problems because of their interesting logical character rather 
than because of their empirical importance. It seems likely that uncertainty and model 
disagreement are greater obstacles to international cooperation.’ ’ 
10. For example, Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) find that the standard deviation of the 
revision from the preliminary estimate of the real growth rate to the final number is 2.2 
percentage points. 
1  1. Kenen and Schwartz (1  986) have studied the accuracy of current year forecasts 
by the IMF World Economic Outlook for the last fifteen years. They find that the root 
mean squared error among the Summit Seven countries is 0.773 percentage points for 
real growth and 0.743 percentage points for inflation. These prediction errors, relatively 
small, are in themselves large enough to reverse the signs of  the derivatives of  the 
welfare function equations (2)-(5). Errors would presumably be much larger for the 
horizons of two years or more that are probably most relevant for policymaking. (Many 
major international econometric models show the effects of monetary and fiscal policy 
peaking in the second year in the case of output, and not reaching a peak within six years 
in the case of the price level or current account. See Bryant et al. 1988.) 
12.  Economists disagree as to the correct estimate of the natural rate of unemploy- 
ment or the level of potential output, for example. 
13.  Another unexpected development in the late 1970s was the downward shift in 
the demand for money in the United States. This disturbance, like the oil shock, meant 
that the planned growth rate of money turned out ex post to be more inflationary than 
expected. 
14. One way to obtain estimates for the weights is to follow Oudiz and Sachs (1984), 
who assume that as of  1984 policymakers were optimizing their objective functions in 
a Nash equilibrium, and infer the welfare weights that they must have had in order to 
produce the observed outcomes  for output,  inflation,  and  the current  account.  The 
estimates turn out to be very sensitive to such things as the model of the economy that 
the policymakers are assumed to have. (To equate the inferred weights with the correct 
rates, as Oudiz and Sachs do, of course requires not only that the policymakers were 
indeed seeking to optimize in a Nash equilibrium in that particular year, but also that 
they  know  the correct  model,  the  correct  weights,  and  the  correct position  of  the 
economy relative to the optimum.) 
15. The German view that the 1978 Bonn Economic Summit entailed joint reflation 
which, in retrospect, was inappropriate has been used above to illustrate, alternatively, 
uncertainty  about  the  baseline  forecast  (the  unanticipated  oil  shock  of  1979) or 
uncertainty about the objective function (the proper weight to be placed on inflation 
versus  growth).  A third  possible  interpretation  is  model uncertainty:  the  Germans 
believe that the slope of their aggregate supply curve turned out to be steeper than they, 140  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
or at least the Americans, thought it would at the time. This interpretation is plausible 
if  one believes that the German labor market is characterized by a high degree of  real 
wage rigidity, as was pointed out by  Branson and Rotemberg (1980). 
16. See the volume edited by Bryant et a]. (1988). 
17. For example, if  capital mobility is  sufficiently low and a depreciation of  the 
domestic currency is contractionary for the foreign country. 
18. A reduction in interest rates causes a net capital outflow which, under a floating 
exchange rate, implies an increase in the current account balance. 
19. In the case where the weights are uniform, each policymaker is playing by the 
same “compromise”  model. One possible way of interpreting such a compromise on 
the model is as a type of cooperation that consists of negotiating over the correct view 
of the world rather than negotiating over policies. See Frankel (1988a). Kenen (1987, 
8-9)  and Bryant (1987, 8) stress that exchange of information is a useful function of 
international cooperation broadly defined. 
20.  Ghosh and Masson (1989) examine the implications of having the policymakers 
update their models in a Bayesian way, an interesting extension of the original problem. 
21.  In any case it would not hurt to try the count on the subset of  cases where the 
countries believe that both will gain. I have not yet done this for all ten models (100 
combinations). But the tables in Frankel and Rockett (1988) can be used to do the count 
for four models. Out of  the sixteen combinations, eight cases are eliminated if  it  is 
assumed that coordination does not take place when one partner thinks that the other 
would lose by the proposed package. Out of the eight remaining “sustainable”  cases, 
and the corresponding thirty-two possible outcomes, the United States turns out to gain 
in  twenty-four cases and the rest of thc OECD in twenty-two cases. Thcsc arc only 
slightly better odds in favor of  coordination  than  result  when all combinations  are 
considered admissible. 
22.  This list did not appear in the communique, but rather in comments to the press by 
U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary David Mulford. Funabashi (1988, esp. 130ff.) offers a 
fascinating account of the machinations of the G-7  mechanism from 1985 to  1987. 
23.  IMF Survey (26 September 1988): 292. 
24.  “Rebuilding  an  International  Monetary  System,”  Wall  Street  Journul,  23 
February 1988, p. 28. 
25. To  take a recent example, in the Baker-Miyazawa Agreement reached in San 
Francisco  in  September  1986 (and  subsequently  broadened  to  include  the  Federal 
Republic of  Germany and the other countries at the Louvre in February  1987), the 
Japanese apparently agreed to a fiscal expansion in exchange for a promise from the 
U.S.  Treasury Secretary that he would stop “talking down”  the dollar (plus the usual 
U.S. promise to cut the budget deficit). In the months that followed, each side viewed 
the other as not living up to the agreement. (The episode is described in  Funabashi 
1988). But it was difficult for anyone to verify the extent of compliance, because the 
prccisc tcrms of the original agreement had not been public. 
26.  See  Krugman  (1988)  for  the  application  of  the  latest  “smooth  pasting” 
technology to this problem. 
27.  Dornbusch and Frankel (1988, sec. 111.6). 
28.  It is clear from Funabashi (1988) that the various members held differing views 
as to which indicators were most important, what responses were called for if indicators 
strayed from the agreed-upon path, and how binding the agreement should be. It is also 
clear that each was able to interpret the Plaza and Louvre agreements afterwards so as 
to reflect his own views. 
29.  Williamson and Miller (1987) address the n -  1 problem. 
30.  Williamson and Miller (1987, 54-55)  and Miller and Williamson (1988) do 
precisely this: assume that there is a large “fad” component to exchange rate fluctuations 
under the current floating regime, and that it would disappear under their target zone 141  Obstacles to Coordination 
proposal. (The idea is not absurd. But it certainly “stacks the deck”  in an empirical 
comparison of  the two regimes.) 
3 1.  Indeed there is some evidence that the prices of gold and other commodities react 
instantaneously to changes in expectations regarding whether monetary policy will be 
tight or loose in the future. (Frankel and Hardouvelis  1985.) 
32.  Another of  Frenkel,  Goldstein,  and Masson’s  (1988) arguments  against the 
claim that the gains from coordination are small is to cite results of Currie, Levine, and 
Vidalis (1987) to the effect that a comparison of the cooperative equilibrium allowing 
scope for governments  to establish reputations  with  the  analogous  noncooperative 
equilibrium shows large gains to coordination. 
33.  For example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1988). 
34.  Dornbusch and Frankel (1987) note some qualifications, relevant for the U.S. 
political process, to this standard view of protectionist pressures. 
35.  Besides subtracting from total GNP that part going to the foreign sector (the 
trade balance),  it might also be a good idea to subtract that part going to inventories 
as suggested by Gordon (1985). 
36.  The  Williamson-Miller  blueprint  also  specifies that  the  G-7  should  set  the 
average level of their interest rates so as to attain a target for the aggregate level of their 
GNPs. This part of their plan is similar to part (a) of my proposal. It is my part (b), 
cooperative  yearly  setting of  each  country’s nominal  demand  target  to be  attained 
primarily through monetary policy, that differs the most from their plan (aside from my 
treatment of  exchange rate stability as a separable issue). 
37.  For attempts to evaluate empirically the stabilizing properties of the blueprint plan, 
see Miller and Williamson (1988) and Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1988, 33-49). 
Frenkel and Goldstein (1986) survey target zone proposals. Miller and Williamson also 
consider a floating rate regime and the McKinnon (1984) proposals to use monetary policy 
to target the aggregate money supply-or  in a later version the aggregate price level- 
among the G-3 countries. McKibbin and Sachs (1988) also compare these regimes. As yet, 
I am not aware of empirical work evaluating the likely outcome if countries cooperatively 
set nominal GNP targets (and use monetary policy to attain them). 
38.  A related objection is that a plan for using monetary policy to target nominal 
GNP would have done little to prevent the major disequilibrium that arose in the early 
1980s, the U.S. budget and trade deficits. But I agree with Feldstein (1983) that this 
disequilibrium was not a “coordination  failure,” that the U.S. administration did not 
to any extent pursue the policies it did as a result of insufficient expansion by  trading 
partners. Indeed the administration did not even want Europe. and Japan to expand, until 
after 1985. No international bargain would have brought about a U.S.  fiscal correction. 
Only a recognition by the administration and Congress of the link between their fiscal 
policies and the trade deficit (together with the political will necessary to make difficult 
budget choices) would have done so. By the same token, neither INT nor any other 
proposals for coordination should now be allowed to distract attention from the point 
that the most important policy changes to be made in 1989 can be made unilaterally 
by  the United  States.  Such thoughts  are  supported by  the  findings in Frankel  and 
Rockett (1988) and Frankel (1988a) that the gains from coordination are usually smaller 
than  the  gains from  the  United  States  discovering  the true  model  and unilaterally 
adjusting its policies accordingly. 
39.  A number of authors, including Rogoff (198%) and Giavazzi and Giovannini 
(1988), have pointed out that European plans to decrease both the remaining degree of 
exchange rate flexibility and the remaining level of barriers to financial integration may 
run into trouble  if the individual countries are not ready to give up their remaining 
policy independence. 
40.  Dornbusch and Frankel (1988) discuss ten proposals for world monetary reform. 
Four entail decentralized policy rules: new classical fatalism, a gold standard, national 142  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
monetarism, and national nominal income targeting as discussed in section 3.2.1. Four 
foresee  enhanced  coordination:  the  G-7  indicators  as  discussed  in  section  3.2.2, 
Williamson’s target zones, McKinnon’s “world  monetarism,”  and the Hosomi Fund. 
Two propose enhanced independence: the Tobin tax on transactions and the Dornbusch 
proposal for a dual exchange rate. 
41.  “A  New Collar for Currency Markets,”  The International Economy (MayIJune 
1988): 36-38.  (See also Wall Street Journal, 25 September 1987, p. 22.) 
42.  In the case of Europe, it seems that a unified currency is the ultimate goal (and 
a strengthened role for the ecu is considered the first step). In August 1988, a European 
Community summit meeting agreed to establish a committee that would study creation 
of  a monetary union and to examine the issue at a Madrid meeting scheduled for June 
1989. See Casella and Feinstein (1988) for a theoretical analysis. 
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Comment  Ralph C. Bryant 
A General Reaction to the Paper’ 
I found this paper stimulating. It contains many observations that strike me as 
sensible and interesting. And I  was gratified to see that Frankel seems to be 
subtly shifting gears in his research on the problems of international cooper- 
ation.  (Note, however,  that there is some disjuncture  between the first and 
second halves of the paper. The “new Frankel” only appears in the second half 
after paying obeisance to the old Frankel in the first half.) 
Despite sharing many of the views expressed in the paper, I also find myself 
in disagreement on a number of points. The general drift of his argument takes 
Frankel to a position that I cannot share. Frankel advocates, it seems to me, 
a second, or even  third,  best  position  on the  subject of  intergovernmental 
coordination of economic policies; he believes that a first best approach cannot 
work, and hence that the first best is the enemy of the attainable second best. 
I am more optimistic about making progress, albeit slowly, toward a first best 
approach. So on balance I come out in rather a different place on how nations 
should be trying to cooperate with each other about macroeconomic policies.2 
“Uncertainty”  and the Obstacles It Poses for Coordination 
In section 3.2 of the paper, Frankel stresses the obstacles to cooperation and 
coordination that stem from model ~ncertainty.~  For  my  taste,  he oversells 
some of  the points and has some of the nuances wrong. 
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Uncertainty about sign of  spillover eflects.  For example, he exaggerates the 
degree of our ignorance about the consequences of  policy actions. He asserts 
flat-footedly that  models  are all  over the block  in  what  they  say  about  the 
effects of one country’s policy actions on other countries. In this paper, as in 
several of his other papers (for example, Frankel and Rockett 1988), he argues 
that  policymakers  cannot  even be  sure of  the  signs of  various cross-border 
spillovers. He points especially to monetary policy (see his table 3. l), stating 
that  “the  effects on all three target variables  [output, price level, and trade 
balance] in the other country are completely  ambiguous in sign.” 
In my opinion, there is no significant empirical ambiguity about the sign of 
the spillover effects of fiscal actions for the major industrial countries. Fiscal 
expansions cause an appreciation of the own-country currency and lead to an 
expansion of real activity abroad (vice versa for fiscal contractions). For a large 
majority of models, the “positive”  transmission is substantial in the first three 
years following a fiscal a~tion.~ 
Frankel is literally correct about the signs of the monetary policy  spillover 
effects: some are small negative, and some arc small positive.  But he ought 
to acknowledge the more important point that the magnitude of the effect, of 
whatever sign, is probably quite small. Even theory suggests that the effects 
might be fairly small.5 The 1986 Brookings conference results, which are the 
ones cited in his table 3.1, showed that the absolute sizes of monetary spillover 
effects tend to be empirically  small. Further results from later conferences, 
such as the one at the Federal Reserve in May of 1988, confirm that conclusion. 
For the time being, the best guess one can make about the consequences of 
monetary actions on output in foreign countries is to assume a zero effect. The 
implications  for potential  policy  coordination  of  that generalization  are less 
dramatic than Frankel suggests. 
Is coordination just us likely to make things worse?  Frankel  answers this 
question: possibly yes. Here is another place where, for my taste, he has been 
overselling  his  conclusions. In  the Frankel  and  Rockett  (1988) paper,  the 
analysis  is too  much of  a mechanical bean-counting  exercise. It  classifies 
outcomes as welfare increasing or reducing merely by looking at the signs of 
the effects; it gives very small gains or losses the same weight as large gains 
and  losses.  Even  in  the  final  version  of  the  analysis as  published  in  the 
American Economic  Review,  which  does include  a  discussion  of  treating 
policymakers’ attitudes about the models as uncertain, this rather mechanical 
classification persists. 
Frankel mentions but then downplays some recent important research by 
Ghosh and Masson (1988a, 1988b). Ghosh and Masson conclude that model 
uncertainty,  far from precluding  policy coordination, may  in fact provide a 
strong incentive for countries  to coordinate their macroeconomic policies (a 
conclusion virtually the opposite from that reached by Frankel). There is much 147  Obstacles to  Coordination 
more validity in the Ghosh and Masson analysis, I believe, than Frankel’s brief 
discussion acknowledges. 
Similarly, Frankel  remains  doubtful  about  making  a distinction  between 
“strong bargains”  and “weak bargains,” as suggested by Holtham and Hughes 
Hallett (1987). I believe that this distinction is significant and that taking it into 
account somewhat mitigates the proposition that attempts at policy coordination 
could make things worse rather than better.6 
Possible gains from the “mere”  exchange of information.  Another respect 
in which Frankel and I differ is on the gains from consultation and information 
exchange. These gains could include sizable benefits from consultations about 
differences among analytical models, with a resulting convergence of analyt- 
ical views (Bryant 1987). Such gains as have resulted from intergovernmental 
meetings in the past can in large part be attributed to “mere”  consultations. 
I believe that the potential gains of this sort could be considerable and deserve 
greater weight than Frankel gives to them. Others such as Feldstein (1988) are 
even less prone than Frankel to give such points adequate due. 
An overall judgment.  As  a  series of  recent  papers  by  Frankel  and  other 
authors have emphasized, it is of course possible that attempted coordination 
of  economic  policies  could  be  mistaken  and  lead  to  welfare  losses.  In 
particular, if policymakers use a seriously incorrect model, they are likely to 
get into hot water and do damage to welfare.  But this conclusion is scarcely 
surprising or controversial! 
Moreover, what practical options are open to policymakers in a world in which 
all models are highly uncertain? They plainly do not have the option of not using 
any model at all-unless  they believe that sucking their thumbs is an acceptable 
substitute. Policymakers cannot set all their policy instruments at “zero”  settings, 
so to speak, and just decide to have no policy at all. Cross-border spillovers will 
exist, and may sometimes be large, even if the policymakers decide to ignore such 
effects when they make decisions. 
All things considered, I am unwilling to go along with Frankel in stressing 
model uncertainty as a reason for hesitating to encourage greater cooperative 
efforts among national governments about their macroeconomic policies. 
Nominal GNP Targeting:  A  Variant of  an Intermediate-Target Strategy 
I come now to the part of Frankel’s paper putting forward his proposal for 
nominal income targeting. 
The first point deserving attention is that Frankel’s proposal is essentially a 
variant of what in the domestic monetary literature is known as an intermediate- 
target strategy. This is true both for the closed-economy  variants of  nominal 
GNP targeting and for Frankel’s suggestion to use nominal GNP targets as the 
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The basic features of an intermediate-target strategy are essentially different 
from strategies  that  focus directly  on the  ultimate  targets  of  policy.  In  an 
intermediate-target strategy, policymakers select a variable to use as a surrogate 
(“intermediate”)  target that (1) is thought to have a “reliable”  relationship to 
the variables that are the ultimate targets of policy, and (2) will be capable of 
being fairly closely “controllable”  by the policy authority. Furthermore, pol- 
icymakers decompose the complete decision problem they face into two stages, 
with different periodicities of  decision-making for the two stages. At a first 
stage, reasoning backwards from their ultimate-target variables, they decide on 
the path for the surrogate target only infrequently-for  example, only once a 
year. In the second stage, however, they vary the instruments of policy much 
more continuously in the shorter run, focusing attention on deviations of the 
intermediate-target  variable from its selected path. 
Why a Nominal GNP Targeting Strategy is Prohlemutic in u Purely 
“Domestic”  Context 
One serious problem  with a two-stage, intermediate-target  strategy is the 
inevitable  trade-off  between  the  reliability  criterion  and  the  controllability 
criterion.  The two criteria point in opposite directions. The more reliable  a 
variable is in its linkages to the ultimate-target variables, the less easily and 
closely  it can be controlled  by  the adjustment  of  policy  instruments. Con- 
versely, the more closely an intermediate variable is tied to policy instruments, 
the more complex and numerous the behavioral relationships  between it and 
the ultimate-target variables. There is no way out of  this dilemma, and no one 
ideal intermediate-target  variable. The price that has to be paid for selecting 
a surrogate target that can be controlled closely is to accept greater uncertainty 
about the links between the surrogate and the ultimate targets, and vice versa.’ 
Why, it must be asked, should policymakers  put themselves in the box of 
focusing on only one surrogate target as the focus of their short-run decisions? 
There are a  variety  of  conceivable justifications  that  have  been  advanced, 
mainly in connection with using one or another definition of  the money stock 
as the surrogate target. An  information-flow justification  asserts that such a 
strategy makes better use of up-to-date  information  about the economy.  An 
uncertainty  justification  asserts  that  such  an  approach  copes  better  with 
uncertainty  about how the economy functions. Two other possibilities  are a 
game-theoretic,  expectational  justification  (announcing  a  surrogate  target 
induces  favorable  effects on private  sector behavior)  and  an  “insulation” 
justification (surrogate targets insulate policy from the short-run vagaries of the 
political process or from the incompetence  of policymakers). 
None  of  these  conceivable justifications  is  analytically  convincing when 
subjected to analysis. Several of them have been shown to be flatly wrong.8 
Logically, there is no need to focus on a single intermediate variable. Multiple 
ultimate targets, the use of a variety of intermediate variables as indicators, and 
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problems. For any given degree of model uncertainty-that  is, basic uncertainty 
about  the  behavioral  relationships  that  link  instruments  to  ultimate-target 
variables-policymakers  can always do at least as well if they implement policy 
with a single-stage strategy as with a two-stage, intermediate-target strategy. 
Paradoxically, Frankel sees the disadvantage of using the money stock as an 
intermediate target and is a vigorous critic of so doing. I believe he gives far 
too little weight to the analogous arguments that undercut his case for nominal 
GNP targeting.  I can agree with him that a nominal domestic-demand target 
would be preferable, internationally and domestically, to a monetary aggregate 
target, or an exchange rate target, ifpolicymakers were to choose to focus on 
only one variable as a target. But the premise is unfortunate: I cannot see any 
valid reason for policymakers to constrain their choice problem in that manner. 
I  dislike the Frankel INT strategy for another reason, stemming from its 
likely treatment of fiscal policy. Advocates of nominal GNP targeting typically 
think of monetary policy as the instrument of macroeconomic policy. It is all 
very  well to speak about monetary  policy needing to focus on a  “nominal 
anchor.”  1 too believe that monetary policy needs to pay a lot of  attention to 
nominal anchors. But there are large problems if fiscal policy is immobilized, 
particularly  if  it  is thought  that  monetary  policy  can exclusively  focus  on 
nominal variables. 
I have  never been  able to understand  why  some enthusiasts  can discuss 
nominal  GNP targeting  for monetary  policy  without  ever  bringing  up the 
question of how monetary policy does or does not mesh with budgetary policy. 
I  am even a holdout for the old-fashioned view that central banks should be 
concerned with real as well as nominal targets. And I certainly am a holdout 
for the  view  that monetary  and  fiscal policies  ought  to be formulated  in  a 
coordinated  way.  The American  economy, just like an  automobile,  cannot 
feasibly be divided up into separate parts, with one driver given control of the 
gas pedal and a second driver allocated the brakes.  No doubt it would be an 
easier and more manageable world if monetary policy and fiscal policy could 
be  compartmentalized  so that  the  Federal  Reserve  could  be  told  to worry 
exclusively  about  inflation,  while  the  administration  and  Congress  could 
exclusively worry about real growth and employment. But, alas, the world is 
not that simple. The actions of the Federal Reserve influence real growth and 
jobs, not only prices. Fiscal actions influence inflation as well as real growth. 
It is therefore no “solution”  to the problems of  economic policy to tell the 
Federal Reserve to pay attention exclusively to nominal variables while the 
administration and Congress worry about output and jobs. That is especially 
true if  the Federal Reserve and the administration have differing preferences 
about what the national objectives ought to be! 
International  surveillance  through nominal GNP targeting.  Essentially the 
same objections  apply to the  idea of  countries jointly using  nominal  GNP 
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international context either. The case for using a common intermediate-target 
variable as the focus of cooperation across countries is no more persuasive than 
the case for using a surrogate intermediate  target d~mestically.~ 
An Evolutionary  “First-Best”  Vision 
Frankel’s paper argues for international cooperation beginning ‘‘on a small 
scale” and then having it “grow as the degree of political consensus grows.” 
This incremental  approach  strikes me as politically  sound, and I share with 
Frankel the conviction that progress is likely to come in this evolutionary way. 
Frankel infers, however, that this “epsilon-small by epsilon-small’’ approach 
supports his proposal for nominal income targeting. I do  not see that inference 
as compelling. On the contrary, I believe that incremental progress is equally 
consistent with other visions of  how international cooperation might proceed. 
My own alternative, first-best vision would have the following  elements. 
Each of the national governments participating  in the process  would  submit 
projections  of  the baseline outlook  (either  with  own-country  policies  un- 
changed,  or incorporating  policy  changes that  have  already  been  decided 
upon).  Each  projection  would  preferably  be  derived from some analytical 
framework  (“model”)  that  tries  to be  internally  consistent. An  individual 
government would  concentrate most  on projecting  the key  macroeconomic 
variables pertaining to its own economy. But each government would also be 
free  to  submit projections  for  other economies if  it  chose to  do so.  An 
international  institution that provides the secretariat for “surveillance”  (ex- 
tensive  monitoring  of  the  process)  would  also  provide  its  own  baseline 
projections of the outlook for each major country or region. One may think of 
the IMF World Economic Outlook and the OECD Economic Outlook exercises 
as nascent prototypes of  such surveillance. 
Which variables-‘  ‘indicators”-would  be focused upon in these projec- 
tions? In principle, a variety would be projected and evaluated, not merely one 
or two. Equally  important,  the  actual  instruments and the  ultimate-target 
variables of national policies  would both feature prominently  in the projec- 
tions.  In no sense would the exercise focus only on intermediate,  indicator 
variables. 
Then, in addition to the baseline projections,  the exercise would typically 
consider “what if” simulations. Such simulations  would examine what would 
be  the consequences if  this  or that  policy  instrument  were  to be changed. 
Similarly, the questions would be asked: What if such and such a nonpolicy 
shock were to occur? Changes resulting from these hypothetical  policy  and 
nonpolicy alterations would be measured relative to the baseline outlook. Such 
“what if” scenarios would be prepared, at a minimum, by the international 
secretariat. Ideally, national governments would also be interested in preparing 
their own “what if” simulations, for changes in their own policy instruments 
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for  various  nonpolicy  shocks.  (Differences  in  preferred  models  would  of 
course lead to differences in the answers to the  “what if” questions.) 
At periodic meetings of policymakers and/or their deputies, the discussions 
would examine both the baseline-outlook projections and the  “what if ”sce- 
narios. No less important, the discussions would involve frank exchanges of 
information on what  individual governments’  goals were.  Efforts would  be 
made to classify differences in baseline projections and “what if”  scenarios 
according to whether they were  due to differences  in goals, differences  in 
preferred models, or differences in assumptions about nonpolicy shocks. 
The international  secretariat would play,  and would be  acknowledged  as 
playing,  a key analytical role. In particular,  the secretariat would catalyze a 
systematic comparison of the prior meetings’ ex ante projections  with new 
information  about  how  the  ex  post  outcome  was  turning  out.  And  the 
secretariat would try to use  judiciously chosen, “what if” scenarios to catalyze 
mutually  supportive changes in policies. 
A rudimentary variant of the preceding vision of intergovernmental coop- 
eration does not seem to me beyond reach at the present time. Efforts along 
these  lines  might  be amenable  to evolutionary  strengthening  no  less  than 
Frankel’s  nominal  income  targeting.  Indeed,  on  days  when  I  am feeling 
optimistic, I even think that the last few years of G-7 discussions have been 
hesitantly  groping in this direction. 
To be sure, on my pessimistic days, I fear that actual discussions in G-7 
meetings have focused primarily on ‘‘exchange rate cooperation”  and have not 
been edging toward this vision of what could happen. The Louvre Accord of 
February  1987, if  one can  accept  the  account  of  it  by  Funabashi  (1988), 
suggests an example of poorly conceived cooperation not consistent with the 
first-best vision. lo 
Having disagreed with Frankel on several points, I want to agree strongly 
with him on questions of  more public disclosure of  projections,  targets, and 
intentions for using policy instruments.  Surely it ought to be possible for the 
G-7  finance  ministers  to  authorize  a  somewhat  fuller  and  more  candid 
description of what the surveillance process is at the current time and how they 
might see it evolving in future years! 
Economists’ Public Discussions of  Intergovernmental  Cooperation 
To conclude, I want to put forward a proposal of my own, for better balance 
in what we economists say in public about the subject of international  “co- 
operation”  and ‘‘coordination”  of national economic policies. 
An unfortunate dynamic seems to have crept into our public debates. Broad 
conclusions about the merits and demerits of  intergovernmental cooperation 
have been polarized. For example, Jeff Frankel has tended to emphasize the 
negative  aspects  and  the  potential  for  ham. Martin  Feldstein  has  gone 
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aspects and the potential for benefits, has been characteristic of  others-for 
example, Jacob Frenkel and his co-authors in recent papers. I, too, have tended 
to stress the positive aspect. 
As Bill Branson and Stanley Fischer also observed at the conference itself, 
perhaps economists just relish  arguing with each other, particularly  about 
intergovernmental  cooperation and coordination. Yet my proposal is that we 
should be more on our guard against this polarizing tendency. Little is served 
by exaggerating our analytical disagreements, especially in discussions before 
nonspecialized  audiences who are not familiar  with all the  caveats to  the 
polarized positions. In fact, I believe, there is less dispersion of views among 
us than the wider public has been led to believe. Why not let that situation shine 
through in public discussions? 
Notes 
1. The original version of  Frankel’s paper was entitled  “A  Modest Proposal for 
International Nominal Targeting (INT),” resembling the title of Jonathan Swift’s 1729 
famous satire (“A modest proposal for preventing the children of poor people in Ireland 
from being  a burden  to  their  parents  or  country . . .”).  Accordingly,  the  original 
version of my comments began with some observations about the witting or unwitting 
following of  J. Frankel in J. Swift’s footsteps. Because Frankel subsequently altered 
his title, I have deleted my original opening remarks. 
2.  I  use  “cooperation”  to refer  to  the  entire  range  of  activities  through  which 
national governments might collaborate; “coordination”  refers to the more ambitious 
forms  of  cooperation  in  which  governments  mutually  adjust  their  behavior  after 
bargaining consultations.  For  discussion,  see  Bryant  (1987) or Horne  and  Masson 
(1988). 
3.  Note that the bulk of section 3.2,  despite its title of “Overcoming Obstacles,”  is 
really about the obstacles,  not about overcoming them. 
4.  The only models suggesting that fiscal expansions depreciate the own-country 
currency and/or have negative effects on foreign real activity are known to be defective 
(in particular, because they fail to allow adequately for capital mobility). For further 
discussion, see Bryant et al. (1988, ch. 3) and Bryant, Helliwell, and Hooper (1989). 
5.  For a fiscal action, the effects from incomelabsorption changes and expenditure 
switching both work in the same direction on the current balance of the originating 
country, and also on output in foreign countries. The total effect is the sum of both gross 
effects. In contrast, for a monetary action, the income/absorption and the expenditure- 
switching effects work in opposite directions, suggesting that the total effect-a  net 
sum of two gross effects with differing signs-could  be small. 
6.  In all bargains that can be reached, each party expects to gain: his own model 
predicts  that  gains  will  occur.  In  “strong”  bargains,  each  party  expects  to  gain 
according to the other party’s  model as well as his own. In contrast,  in a “weak” 
bargain,  one or both of the parties  will be disappointed  if  the other party’s model 
proves  to  be  correct.  Frankel’s  discussion  of  the  argument  made  by  Holtham  and 
Hughes Hallett is not persuasive to me, but I do not have space to  rebut Frankel’s 
position here. 
7. Frankel emphasizes the need for policymakers to be able to  monitor  “perfor- 
mance”  of the surrogate-target variable. But he fails to stress that nominal GNP has 153  Obstacles to Coordination 
terrible  characteristics  from  this  perspective:  how  can  policymakers  tell  whether 
changes  in  countries’  nominal  GNPs  are  due  to  policy  actions  or  to unexpected 
nonpolicy shocks? 
8. My comments here  summarize an argument I have made carefully elsewhere 
(Bryant 1980, 1983). 
9. Frankel would prefer to use total nominal domestic demand rather than nominal 
GNP if  his general approach could be adopted internationally. On  this point, he is 
unambiguously right. For the reasons he summarizes, if national governments were to 
go down his second-best road, they should do so by focusing on total domestic demand, 
not GNP. 
10. In passing, note that Frankel gives a minor nod in the direction of the first-best 
vision by admitting that “epsilon-small”  evolutionary cooperation could take the form 
I have outlined. But he then, unconvincingly, goes back to his theme that a long list 
of  indicators  is a bad  thing and  that  incrementalism requires  focusing on  a single 
variable, nominal GNP. 
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Comment  Douglas D. Purvis 
Jeffrey  Frankel’s  paper  presents  a  number  of  interesting  and  challenging 
analytical points and opinions on the potential for international coordination 
of macroeconomic policies. It has not triggered an especially cogent response 
from me, but  rather a number of  somewhat disconnected  thoughts  on  the 
subject. This response is due partly to the nature of the views presented in his 
paper-which  I found difficult to understand  as a coherent package. But. my 
response also reflects my own admitted ambivalence on the issue. To  pursue 
the not entirely semantic point raised in the first session at this conference, I 
support international cooperation broadly conceived, but-for  reasons similar 
to those already put forward by Stanley Fischer and Martin Feldstein in earlier 
sessions of  this conference, and indeed in a number of Jeff  Frankel’s own 
writings on the subject-I  remain skeptical about the benefits of tighter forms 
of international policy coordination. 
In what follows, I  will use the term cooperation to describe the ongoing 
informal processes  involving  consultation  and the exchange of information, 
while reserving  the term coordination to  describe more explicit attempts to 
design and implement economic policies at the international level. Of course, 
there is nothing  that rules out cooperation  leading to policies  that  differ  in 
important ways from those that would have been followed in the absence of 
cooperation, but  the key difference is that  policy  changes are not  formally 
negotiated in some international forum. 
My own ambivalence on the issue of coordination stood me in good stead 
as I tried to digest Frankel’s proposal. One particularly unsettling aspect of his 
paper  is  that  it  devotes  a  great  deal  of  space to presenting  a  persuasive 
discussion of the obstacles to successful international coordination of policies, 
and then goes on to develop a case for international nominal targeting  (INT) 
as a strategic first step towards international policy coordination. The imme- 
diate question that  arises is: what  if one found both arguments convincing? 
How could one reconcile a negative perspective on ‘‘full coordination” with 
a case for taking  the first  step toward  that  goal? Frankel’s  paper does not 
address this question, in part because it is completely  silent about what the 
ultimate goal of  “full coordination” actually looks like. In that respect, I am 
reminded  of  the  immortal words of  that  great  American  philosopher,  Yogi 
Berra: “If you don’t know where you are going, you might end up somewhere 
else.” 
Before discussing some of the specifics of Frankel’s paper, I want to note 
an irony in the literature on policy coordination. Interest in policy coordination 
is often motivated by the observation that the flexible exchange rate system has 
somehow failed. Some of the evidence that is often adduced in support of this 
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view is that national macroeconomic policies are not nearly as independent as 
the standard theory predicts, and that business cycles remain closely synchro- 
nized  internationally.  Yet  most proposals for coordination  reinforce  both of 
these outcomes! Of course, what is missing in my statement of the “irony” 
is that, in the absence of coordination, the outcome is achieved in conjunction 
with excessive exchange rate variability, while coordination attempts to limit 
such variability;  in this regard  I wish Frankel  had not been  so brief  in his 
discussion  in section  3.3, “Policy Independence and Exchange Rate Flexi- 
bility.” The brevity of that section also undermines Frankel’s discussion of the 
“Hosomi Fund”; the case for such a fund is not established, nor does there 
appear a serious discussion of how such a fund would actually operate or what 
it might reasonably  be expected to achieve. 
I now take up a number of specific questions raised by Frankel’s proposal. 
Absence of Consideration of  the Monetary/Fiscal  Mix 
In developing his case for INT, Frankel explicitly sets aside questions of the 
monetary/fiscal mix, choosing instead to “address problems concerning the 
overall degree of expansion of macroeconomic policies, whether monetary and 
fiscal policies are too tight or too loose, rather than the proper mix of the two.” 
I believe that this strategy is unfortunate for two related reasons. 
First, the strategy ignores the different incentives that are created for policy 
reactions in one country by the choice of policy mix in its trading partners. 
Thus if  Frankel’s  proposal  for INT were  adopted,  how  the  United  States 
achieved its nominal income target would strongly influence how the OECD 
countries would wish to react in order to achieve their targets. It is impossible 
for me to imagine the determination and implementation of acceptable taigets 
proceeding without consideration  of the policy mix. 
Second, Frankel ultimately hangs his INT proposal on the issue of  whether 
one views the shortcoming of the Nash noncooperative equilibrium as being 
one of either insufficient or excessive contraction. However,  except for the 
inflation credibility issue-which  in any event strictly applies only to monetary 
policy-the  issue is perhaps better phrased in terms of excessive or insufficient 
short-term reaction  of  policy  to  disturbances rather  than  in  terms  of  the 
average- or medium-term stance of the policy.  Thus the “shortcomings”  are 
perhaps  better  viewed  in terms of the nature  of  the international  spillovers 
created  by  domestic policy  actions. If  a  particular policy  has beggar-thy- 
neighbor effects on its trading partners, then that policy will tend to be used 
excessively  in the absence of  cooperation, while  if  a policy  has beneficial 
effects on its trading  partners, it will be used  insufficiently.  Whether these 
mean policy will be too contractionary  or too inflationary depends upon the 
specifics of the situation, including the nature of the appropriate model, on the 
relevant history of the economies (i.e., on the state of the business cycle), and 
on the nature of the shocks hitting the system. Had the question been posed 
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the nature of  the spillovers created by the two policies can be quite different, 
as can the appropriate domestic response of each to any particular shock. 
These points are illustrated clearly by the experience of the OECD countries 
in the early 1980s. It can be argued that the sharp monetary  contraction  in 
the  United  States  was  essentially  beggar-thy-neighbor  in  its effects on the 
other OECD countries, serving primarily to “export”  U.S. inflation via real 
appreciation. Those countries reacted to their increased inflation by adopting 
tight monetary  policies; the business cycle was harmonized  not because  the 
effects of  the U.S.  disinflation were  generalized  but  because  the U.S. pol- 
icy was mimicked  by  her  major  trading  partners. Clearly  the international 
repercussions would have been dramatically  different had the U.S. achieved 
the same nominal income using fiscal contraction! (This is taken up in detail 
in my paper “Public Sector Deficits, International Capital Movements and the 
Domestic Economy: The Medium-Term is the Message,”  Canadian Journal 
of  Economics 18, no. 4 [November  19851.) 
Further, I would also suggest that not distinguishing between monetary and 
fiscal policies may bias the case for nominal income targeting; if, for example, 
the paper had focused on monetary policy, a good case could have been made 
for targeting only the inflation rate rather than nominal income. 
The Perceived Obstacles to  ‘‘Full’’ Coordination 
Section 3.2, a major section of  Frankel’s paper,  is called  “Overcoming 
Obstacles to Coordinated Expansion or Contraction.”  In fact, the title of  the 
section is highly misleading as most of  the discussion is devoted to showing 
how powerful the obstacles are and gives little attention to the issue of how 
to overcome them. The discussion is thoughtful and persuasive; in many places 
one is  surprised  at how  “operational”  the perspective  is.  But  lurking just 
beneath  the  surface  is the  macroeconomic F-word; what  is  presented  is a 
compelling case against “fine-tuning.” I, for one, am convinced of  the case, 
and  indeed  much  of  my  suspicion  of  proposals  for  international  policy 
coordination arises from the belief that most proposals involve thinly disguised 
fine-tuning and hence are doomed to the failures that have rewarded virtually 
all previous such efforts. 
Other than reiterating my basic concerns about where Frankel’s proposal is 
taking us, I have only a couple of minor comments on this section; in the spirit 
of  cooperation if not coordination, I leave the discussion of the implications 
and  interpretation  of  the  results  of  the  empirical  international  modeling 
exercises to Ralph Bryant. 
First, the  discussion  of  model  uncertainty  might  be dismissed  (perhaps 
wrongly) by many readers as “quibbling”  about details while at the same time 
masking more fundamental disagreements. One obvious example is the “two 
solitudes” that have characterized  American  official positions  and those  of 
most other countries  about the  “twin  deficits.”  A related  issue is the con- 
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matter; as Stanley Fischer reminded  us in the opening discussion, this con- 
troversy is central to most other branches of modem macroeconomics but is 
conspicuously  absent from discussion  at this conference. 
Second,  I  worry  that  in  some circumstances  the  international  cooperation 
process sometimes leads to too much convergence. Officials sometimes fall into 
the trap of too readily accepting superficial and politically convenient explanations 
of important events. The “party  line”  is easy to repeat or  let go unchallenged, 
and this can impede proper analysis and response to important problems. 
A third reaction I have is to Frankel’s discussion of the G-7 “indicators” 
exercise. One can interpret the indicators as simply putting some structure on 
the cooperative process  of consultation  and information  exchange. Alterna- 
tively, one can think of the list as a series of  targets which govern the coor- 
dination of  policies  and by  which policy  is judged after the fact. Frankel’s 
discussion tends to the latter interpretation, and as a result the G-7 exercise gets 
failing grades as an exercise  in coordination. I  am more sympathetic to the 
former interpretation, and I think in that light the G-7 exercise can be rated more 
positively as an exercise in cooperation. Certainly Frankel’s identification of 
indicators  with  targets colors his  whole discussion  of  the post-Tokyo G-7 
activities. 
Finally, despite the attention given to the technical issues, it becomes clear 
that the most serious obstacle to international coordination-indeed  the only 
one  that  appears  ultimately  to  matter-is  the  perceived  loss  of  national 
sovereignty. It is for this reason that Frankel proposes a “gradual”  evolution 
toward coordination starting with the INT; the argument is that the perceived 
loss of sovereignty from such a modest initiative will be small while the gains 
will provide the basis for gradually expanding the degree of coordination. My 
view is that, if I were to accept the ultimate objective of “full coordination,” 
I would worry that the gradual approach would be too risky. The initial gains 
(both perceived  and actual) would be too small, while the perceived  loss of 
sovereignty would be so large as to undermine domestic political support for 
the exercise. In  many  countries the  finance minister returning  home to  an- 
nounce and defend a target for domestic nominal income growth negotiated 
with officials and politicians  from other countries is simply unacceptable. 
Two Circumstances Where Cooperation Is Essential 
Two circumstances (not identified by Frankel), where cooperation if not in 
fact coordination  might be justified, warrant attention. 
The first is when one country, for whatever reason, changes its medium-term 
objectives and thus initiates a dramatic change in policies. This could happen 
for  example  in  response  to  changes  in  domestic  political  or  economic 
circumstances.  But  whatever  the cause, the change will  have  far-reaching 
implications for the country’s trading partners, and in turn their reaction will 
have important implications for world economic performance. As a result, this 
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have a big payoff. Further gains will be possible if the consultative process 
gives the policy initiative credibility both with the other governments and with 
domestic agents; in  the  best  of  all  worlds,  the credibility  will  be  further 
enhanced by the policy reactions of the other countries. Again the international 
experience with the sharp disinflation initiated in the United States in the early 
1980s serves to illustrate this point. In my view, the other OECD countries 
reacted  to the American initiative  in a manner that had  unfortunate conse- 
quences for the  world  economy;  more  extensive cooperation  might  have 
mitigated  some of  the  output loss and unemployment  that  arose  from the 
worldwide monetary contraction. 
The second is in the event of international crises, financial and otherwise. 
The joint response of the major OECD countries in the face of the worldwide 
stock market crash of October 1987 is widely recognized to have mitigated the 
repercussions of that crash. It seems clear that the lines of communication that 
had been established over the previous few years-in  the summit process, in 
G-5, G-7 and  G-10 meetings, and  through  the forums at the  IMF and the 
OECD-were  important  in  facilitating  the  cooperation  required  for  that 
response.  Similarly,  the  eleventh-hour  negotiations  that  led  to  successful 
negotiation of the Canada-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement were heavily dependent 
on the close working relationship that had evolved between Canadian Minister 
of  Finance  Michael  Wilson and  U.S.  Treasury  Secretary  James  Baker,  a 
relationship that was built up in the G-7 process. 
These two circumstances are relevant in that many commentators think that 
in the next few months the world economy will experience one or the other. 
The election of a new U.S. president in late  1988 will usher in a new era in 
the international economy, and a common view is that the new president will 
have to alter the medium-term  stance of U.S. fiscal policy by addressing the 
federal deficit, or that world financial markets will become unstable. In either 
case, substantial international cooperation  would be in order, and at least the 
lines of communication are open. 
Concluding Remarks 
How then  to evaluate Jeffrey  Frankel’s  proposal.  If  one were  somehow 
forced to accept some form of coordination, then I think that Frankel’s INT is 
an attractive option. For example, I feel much more comfortable with it than 
I do with those proposals that set out explicitly to directly limit exchange rate 
variations,  especially  real  exchange rate  variations.  But  I  also recall  Yogi 
Berra’s admonition  noted  earlier,  and  I  would  feel more comfortable with 
Frankel’s proposal for INT if it represented the actual ultimate desired form of 
coordination rather than simply the first step toward some vague fuller form 
of coordination. 